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THE IDEOLOGIES OF FORUM SHOPPING-
WHY DOESN'T A CONSERVATIVE COURT
PROTECT DEFENDANTS?
GEORGE D. BROWN*
In this Article, Professor George Brown identifies a seeming in-
consistency in the Supreme Court's treatment of federal-state
private law forum shopping and state-state private law forum
shopping. Professor Brown notes that the Court has been explicit
in its condemnation offederal-state forum shopping, but appar-
ently accepts, and even encourages, state-state private law forum
shopping. This is strange behavior from a conservative Court,
since forum shopping threatens traditional conservative values
such as the desire to curtail the proliferation of lawsuits and a
general pro-defendant stance. Furthermore, Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins clearly rejected forum shopping. Professor Brown
reconciles these seemingly contrary positions by explaining that
Erie's basic rationale was adherence to federalism If vigorous
state regulation of private matters was Erie's objective, then re-
jection of federal-state private law forum shopping and accept-
ance of state-state forum shopping are consistent with the spirit
and rationale of Erie Professor Brown concludes that the ap-
parent paradox created by the Court's position offorum shopping
merely reflects the triumph of states' rights over defendants'
rights and adherence to a federalism reading of Erie.
Erie was something more than an opinion which worried
about 'forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws," although to be sure these were important
elements of the decision. I have always regarded that decision as
one of the modern cornerstones of our federalism, expressing pol-
icies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power be-
tween the state and federal systems. Erie recognized that there
should not be two conflicting systems of law controlling the pri-
mary activity of citizens, for such alternative governing authority
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. A.B. 1961, LL.B. 1965, Harvard. The
research for this Article was supported by a grant from the Boston College Law School Dean's
Fund. Many colleagues offered helpful comments and suggestions. I wish to thank, in partic-
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must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the
planning of everyday affairs.
-Justice John M. Harlan'
I. INTRODUCTION
Whatever Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 had to say about forum-
shopping, there is plenty of it going on.3 Under current theories of per-
sonal jurisdiction plaintiffs are frequently free to sue in more than one
state. State substantive laws differ, and under current choice of law theo-
ries litigants are often able to secure the benefits of forum selection. In
cases with multi-state dimensions the result is a bonanza for plaintiffs,
offering them an elaborate set of options that one writer recently de-
scribed as a "forum shopping system."' Judge J. Skelly Wright's earlier
description of the practice as a "national legal pastime" 5 seems, if any-
thing, more accurate today than when he offered it.
This Article focuses on the role of the United States Supreme Court
in establishing the parameters of this system. The Court must frequently
deal with forum-shopping in a number of contexts other than shopping
between states. When confronted with shopping between the state and
federal systems, the Court exhibits strong opposition. The best-known
cases are those that deal with shopping by public law plaintiffs. Deci-
sions on Younger abstention,6 federal habeas corpus,7 and the Eleventh
1. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation and
footnote omitted). For a discussion of Erie see infra text accompanying notes 37-97.
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of
Law Statutes, 80 GEo. L.J. 1, 2 (1991); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and
International, 63 TUL. L. R1v. 553, 553 (1989).
4. Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO. L.. 53, 68 (1991).
5. Judge J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law,
13 WAYNE L. Rv. 317, 333 (1967).
6. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Younger involved an attempt by an indicted
state defendant to secure a federal injunction against the state proceeding on the ground that
the underlying state statute violated the Federal Constitution. The Court held that federal
judicial intervention of this type would run afoul of equity doctrine and the principles of feder-
alism. Id. at 43-47. The doctrine of Younger abstention refers generally to a prohibition on
federal court intervention in pending state proceedings when those proceedings involve an
important state interest, the person seeking federal relief is a party to the state proceedings,
and the federal question presented can be fully considered in the state courts.
7. E.g., Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (1992) (limiting right to a fed-
eral evidentiary hearing only to only those defendants who can show either: (1) cause for
failure to develop the facts in state court proceedings and actual prejudice resulting from that
failure, or (2) that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result); Colman v. Thompson,
111 S. Ct. 2546, 2564-65 (1991) (holding that comity and federalism concerns prohibit federal
habeas review of a state court denial of a prisoner's constitutional claim if the state court's
decision rests on a state procedural default independent of the federal question).
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Amendment8 represent strong, albeit implicit condemnations of federal-
state public law forum-shopping. In dealing with federal-state private
law forum-shopping the Court is explicit in its condemnation.9 In the
face of apparent state-state private law forum-shopping, however, major
decisions such as Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman' seem to accept the practice,
perhaps even to encourage it. Is the Court hopelessly inconsistent, or
does it perceive a distinction between good forum-shopping and bad?
Anything other than a broad condemnation seems strange from a
Court generally viewed as conservative. Forum-shopping threatens such
conservative values as the desire to avoid the proliferation of lawsuits, a
distrust of manipulation of the system to achieve substantive ends (at
least by plaintiffs), and a general pro-defendant tilt. The principal vic-
tims of state-state forum-shopping are interstate corporate entities,'1 an
interest group that the Court might be expected to favor. Moreover, fo-
rum-shopping runs contrary to Erie. That case was a blatant example of
successful federal-state forum-shopping by a private law plaintiff, until
Justice Brandeis thwarted the maneuver, overruling the long line of cases
that permitted it. 2 Everyone knows what the Court held in Erie, but
analysts differ sharply as to its fundamental rationale. 3 If the emphasis
is on fairness, the spirit of Erie may well carry over to condemn state-
state private law forum-shopping. If vigorous state regulation of private
law matters is the goal, perhaps state forum-shopping serves that goal.
This Article emphasizes the federalism reading of Erie and develops
the thesis that this interpretation helps explain why the Court is opposed
to forum-shopping in the federal-state public and private law contexts
while seemingly supportive of the state-state private law variant. In all
three contexts the ultimate winners are the states and their courts. It is
8. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
generally bars federal courts from awarding retroactive monetary relief against states).
9. The Court's most frequent practice in dealing with the matter is to refer to the twin
aims of Erie as the avoidance of forum-shopping and the inequitable administration of the
laws. E.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988); id. at 33 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting.)
10. 486 U.S. 717 (1988). For a discussion of Sun Oil, see infra text accompanying notes
338-49.
11. Juenger, supra note 3, at 557-58 ("[L]arge enterprises began to feel the pull. Because
they do business nationwide, such companies have contacts with numerous states, which
broadens plaintiffs' options considerably."); Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1677, 1691 (1990) ("[F]orum shopping seems likely to be available primarily in cases
in which the defendants are large entities with contacts in many forums.").
12. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-78 (1938) (discussing the political and
social defects of the Swift v. Tyson doctrine and the discrimination that resulted from it).
13. See Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: A
Reconsideration of Erie Principles, 79 Ky. L.J. 231, 237-39 (1990-91).
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hardly surprising that with a conservative Court this would be the end
result. The Article also explores alternative and possibly complementary
explanations for the Court's actions. Part of the answer lies in its reluc-
tance to enter the seemingly endless swamp of conflict of laws disputes,
14
as well as a general aversion to expansive interpretation of constitutional
provisions. There is, however, an alternative explanation that seems out
of character with most of what we know about the Burger-Rehnquist
Court: the view that the Court accepts private law forum-shopping be-
cause it favors the results of pro-plaintiff states.15 It is unlikely that a
conservative Court favors these results, and even more unlikely that it is
a willing participant in a quasi-nationalized system of private law to
achieve such results. While it is still necessary to explain the pro-forum-
shopping paradox, federalism offers a better explanation than another
paradox.
The Article's analysis of the Court's position on state-state forum-
shopping has important implications for the field of conflict of laws, in
particular for the freedom of forum states to utilize a variety of ap-
proaches which permit them to choose their own law. Understanding
how the Court's position evolved suggests that the Court is likely to re-
main there. Because of the Court's strong attachment to a vigorous, di-
verse federalism, it will probably neither abandon the permissive
approach of cases like Sun Oil and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague6 nor
develop alternative approaches under which state choice of law policies
are seriously threatened. Overruling Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Man-
ufacturing Co. 17 and allowing the lower federal courts to create a federal
common law of conflicts, for example, would run counter to the ideal of
state primacy across the entire domain of private law. Stricter constitu-
tional standards-Allstate with teeth-would push the Supreme Court
into declaring the best result in conflict cases. Here again an Erie-based
federalism points toward a hands-off attitude. It is unlikely that Con-
gress will act to provide a national solution. 8 Thus, the forum-shopping
debate will remain the province of state courts and academic
commentators.
14. See Gottesman, supra note 3, at 2-3 n.5.
15. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 68-69. This seems to be the implication of Professor
Weinberg's article, in which she discusses the Supreme Court's role in "shoring up" the forum-
shopping system. Id. at 68. In her other writings, however, to which she cites at this point,
she does not directly advance this hypothesis. See id. at 69 n.87.
16. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). For a discussion of Allstate, see infra text accompanying notes
314-28.
17. 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that in diversity cases, federal courts must decide ques-
tions of conflicts of law according to the rules prevailing in the state in which they sit).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 425-51.
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Part II of the Article advances a definition of forum-shopping that
focuses on the plaintiff's choice of a jurisdiction for substantive law ad-
vantages, and develops an analysis of Erie as a case with both pro- and
anti-forum-shopping dimensions. Part III focuses on forum-shopping
between state courts, reviews the debate over this practice, and explores
at some length the emerging view that forum-shopping advances impor-
tant goals within the legal system. Part IV is an inquiry into the ideology
of litigation. The focus is on the conservative position and on whether
conservative animosity toward public law plaintiffs extends to private law
litigation. To the extent this tilt does carry over, the analysis indicates
that conservatives ought to disapprove strongly of forum-shopping, a
quintessential plaintiff's maneuver. Part V considers the Burger-Rehn-
quist Court's contribution to this area: articulation of a number of posi-
tions that permit state-state forum-shopping to flourish. The thesis is
developed that this seeming paradox reflects a triumph of states' rights
over defendants' rights. The Court, I contend, adheres to an Erie-based
vision of federalism in which the states retain the primary role in private
law. They are encouraged to assert their regulatory authority aggres-
sively. The result is a highly diverse legal climate in which forum-shop-
ping is not just an inevitable by-product but also a sign that the system is
working as it should, in ways that are quite consistent with Erie.
II. ERIE AND FORUM-SHOPPING--A FUNDAMENTAL YET
AMBIVALENT DECISION
A. Defining Forum-Shopping-The Ferens Paradigm
The concept of "forum-shopping" is exceedingly difficult to define
because it encompasses a broad range of actions by plaintiffs and defend-
ants.1 9 The plaintiff makes the initial forum choice, but the defendant
may be able to trump it through such devices as removal from state to
federal court,2" transfer from one federal court to another,21 or dismissal
from a state court on forum non conveniens grounds.22 A party may seek
to derive advantage not only from the substantive law, but also from the
19. See Note, supra note 11, at 1679 ("[T]he methods and permutations of forum shop-
ping are almost limitless.").
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988) (authorizing removal to federal courts of cases within their
original jurisdiction).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) (authorizing transfer of cases within federal court system).
The dismissal of a case on theforum non conveniens ground is a device primarily used in state
courts.
22. The current forum non conveniens doctrine is the subject of much debate. See, ag.,
Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 678-79 (Tex. 1990) (denying forum non
conveniens dismissal on grounds that legislature statutorily abolished doctrine in wrongful
death and personal injury actions arising out of incidents in foreign countries or states).
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attitudes of different judges and juries, the length of court dockets, and
the geographical convenience to itself and its adversary. 3
This Article deals with forum choices by private law plaintiffs to
obtain favorable substantive law. The focus is on law shopping because
the availability of more than one law to govern a large number of dis-
putes with no international aspects is a striking aspect of our federal legal
system. It poses difficult doctrinal problems since evaluating law shop-
ping forces us to balance important values of party fairness against possi-
bly competing values of federalism. The focus on plaintiffs reflects their
first strike advantage as the initiators of litigation. Even when defend-
ants can thwart the choice of forum they may not be able to alter the
plaintiff's initial choice of law.2 4 Moreover, it is the plaintiff's ability to
subject the defendant to more than one governing law-the evil against
which Justice Harlan cautioned in Hanna2 -- that poses the problem of
forum-shopping in its starkest terms.
Even thus restricted, forum-shopping remains difficult to define. A
plaintiff may choose a forum that happens to have favorable law for rea-
sons unrelated to that law. In other cases we might expect the plaintiff to
sue in a particular forum regardless of the content of its law. The notion
with which this Article deals is that of seeking substantive law advan-
tages that are somehow unfair. I will use the following, admittedly loose
definition: A plaintiff engages in forum-shopping when she brings suit in
a particular jurisdiction when other forums are equally or more valid
given the location of the parties and the transaction or occurrence, and
the choice seems motivated primarily by a desire for favorable law.
Ferens v. John Deere, Inc.26 is a recent illustration of this kind of
forum-shopping. Plaintiff was injured while using one of defendant's ma-
chines at his farm in Pennsylvania. He and his wife did not sue until the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations for tort claims had expired. While
they were still able to sue in Pennsylvania under an alternative theory,
they (through their lawyer) apparently viewed the tort claim as the heart
of the case. They brought a tort suit against Deere in a federal district
court in Mississippi, whose state's longer statute of limitations did not
bar the claim.2 They then moved pursuant to section 1404 of Title 2828
23. Note, supra note 11, at 1678-79.
24. Under the rule laid out in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), when the
defendant in a diversity case initiates a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988), the trans-
feree court is to apply the state law which would have been applied by the transferor court.
Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639.
25. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
26. 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
27. Id. at 519-20.
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to transfer the tort claim to a federal court in Pennsylvania.
The trip to Mississippi is a clear example of forum-shopping under
most definitions, including the one offered here. The plaintiffs chose a
forum that even they regarded as inappropriate in order to secure the
benefits of its law. The case is particularly striking because the vagaries
of the system gave them a double bonus: Mississippi law in a Penn-
sylvania (federal) court. Outrage over the maneuver back to Penn-
sylvania-dubbed by Justice Scalia the "file-and-transfer ploy"'2 -
should not obscure the key element of the case: the fact that the legal
system allowed the plaintiffs to shop for Mississippi law, or some other
favorable law,30 in the first place. Ferens is obviously a paradigm; there
will be other cases where the definition works less well. When the plain-
tiff sues in his home state, for example, determining whether forum-shop-
ping has occurred is problematic. It may be impossible to tell whether
the plaintiff shopped for law given the many other reasons for suing
there. Even if he did, the system may regard suing at home as a special
privilege which plaintiffs generally should enjoy.31 Suing the defendant
in his home state32 is also problematic, given the argument that defend-
ants can have no quarrel with being subjected to the legal regime they
have chosen.33 Despite the gray areas, enough relatively clear cases re-
main to indicate that forum-shopping merits discussion.34 If anything,
the phenomenon appears to be occurring more frequently.3" Anyone
who has survived the first year of law school and grappled with Erie36 , is
likely to wonder how this can possibly be so.
28. In order to secure the transfer the plaintiffs had to argue that moving the case from
their chosen forum satisfied the statutory standard which invokes "the convenience of parties
and witnesses, [and] the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
29. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 538 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 527.
31. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert Storage & Transfer, 330 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1947) (dis-
cussing relationship between plaintiff's privilege of choosing forum and motion to dismiss on
grounds of forum non conveniens).
32. E.g., Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 583, 555 P.2d 997, 1002-03
(1976) (allowing plaintiff to take advantage of a more favorable law in a product liability suit
by bringing suit in Washington, defendant's home state, concerning an accident that took place
in Kansas).
33. Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1981).
34. Indeed, as noted, Professor Weinberg describes the current situation as a "forum
shopping system." See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
35. See Gottesman, supra note 3, at 1; Juenger, supra note 3, at 553-54.
36. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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B. Erie. A Case of Forum-Shopping
Despite Justice Harlan's observations in Hanna,37 the view is often
advanced that Erie is a case that worried about forum-shopping. 38 The
facts are a classic example of the practice as defined above. Tompkins
was injured by a train while he walked along the Erie's tracks in Penn-
sylvania. Under the law of Pennsylvania he was a trespasser to whom
the railroad owed only a minimal duty of care. Other states, however,
would treat the railroad as owing him a duty of ordinary care. Under the
rule of Swift v. Tyson,3 9 a federal court could apply what it viewed as the
most appropriate principle of "general law" without regard to the law of
any particular state. Under these circumstances Tompkins obviously did
not wish to sue in a Pennsylvania state court. Suit in any other state
would have been risky because that court would probably apply the law
of the place of injury under then-accepted principles of choice of law.'
Thus, plaintiff's best chance to invoke favorable law was in a federal trial
court." He took that chance, obtained the favorable law, and ended up
with a verdict of $30,000.00. The Supreme Court, however, seized the
case as the vehicle to overrule Swift, thus ending this particular brand of
forum-shopping.
Although Erie is a landmark opinion,42 its basis is far from clear.
Justice Brandeis, for the majority,4 3 began by accepting the argument
that Swift rested on "erroneous" statutory construction and that the
Rules of Decision Act required federal courts generally to follow state
common-law rules. 4 The next section of the opinion elaborated on the
undesirability of the Swift rule by discussing the "mischievous results"
4
37. Indeed, Justice Harlan noted that forum-shopping and inequitable administration of
the laws was a part of Erie. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
38. The Supreme Court's formulation is that the twin aims of Erie were the avoidance of
forum-shopping and inequitable administration of the laws. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,
487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6 (1988); id. at 33 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 744-45 (1980).
39. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
40. Under the rule of the First Restatement of Conflicts, it was widely accepted that the
law of the place of the accident governed. RFSTATEMENT (FiRsT) OF CONFLICT OF LAws
§ 378 (1934).
41. JOHN 3. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 346-47 (5th ed. 1989) (casebook) (dis-
cussing forum-shopping aspects of Erie).
42. E.g., Donald L. Doernberg, Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal, 1990
UTAH L. REV. 759, 761 n.16; Richard D. Freer, Erie's Midlife Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1087,
1088 (1989).
43. Of the eight participating Justices, five joined in the majority, one concurred, and two
dissented.
44. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1938).
45. Id. at 74-77. The opinion noted that rights varied according to the court in which an
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to which it had led. The opinion might have stopped there, but Brandeis
went further and declared the rule of Swift unconstitutional. In the oft-
cited third section of the opinion, he stated:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in
a State whether they be local in their nature or "general," be
they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power
upon the federal courts.'
Erie's ambiguities are several and obvious. If the decision rests on
statutory grounds, the constitutional portion may be unnecessary dic-
tum.47 Even if it is constitutionally based, the Court confused the matter
by failing to cite directly any provision of the Constitution and by placing
some of the apparent constitutional analysis in the portion of the opinion
that rests on other grounds. One can find in the opinion possible invoca-
tions of the doctrines of due process, equal protection, separation of pow-
ers, and federalism.
There is a tendency in recent scholarship to downgrade Erie's im-
portance. The opinion has been treated as essentially ambiguous,4"
largely a matter of statutory construction,4 9 and a statement of the prop-
osition that constitutional limits imposed on the national government ex-
tend to its courts. 50 The notion that the case is not of fundamental
importance may also reflect a perception that the so-called "Erie prob-
lem" of the applicability of state and federal procedural rules in diversity
is not a matter of fundamental importance."' Perhaps Erie is little more
than a case that worried about forum-shopping. Even so, it is important
to understand why the Court thought the practice was bad, perhaps un-
action was brought and that "the privilege of selecting the court in which the right should be
determined was conferred upon the noncitizen." Id. at 75.
46. Id. at 78.
47. See id at 82 (Butler, J., dissenting) ("No constitutional question was suggested or
argued below or here.").
48. Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 881, 927 (1986).
49. See MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER 29-46
(1991). Professor Redish views the issue of federal common law as governed entirely by the
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). Under this view Erie's importance stems
from its correction of the earlier, erroneous view that federal courts could fashion federal
common law. Professor Redish seems to attach little, if any, importance to the constitutional
dimensions of Erie.
50. Doernberg, supra note 42, at 796-97.
51. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 805, 828 (1989) (refer-
ring to the issue of the applicability of state or federal procedural rules in diversity as a "dreary
little side issue").
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constitutional, especially given the fact that so much forum-shopping has
survived Erie. Moreover, the notion that the case is a lot more than a
case concerned about forum-shopping will not go away. Like Justice
Harlan, an array of commentators continue to treat it as a fundamental
statement about the American legal system.52 At this point it seems de-
sirable to focus on the important principles that underlie Erie and to
examine how they bear on forum-shopping.
C. Erie and Fundamental Values
In recent years there has been considerable interest among federal
courts scholars in Erie as a separation of powers case.53 The principal
question has been whether Erie stands as a bar to the making of common
law by federal (as opposed to state) courts, and whether that prohibition
is grounded in the doctrine of separation of powers.54 The third section
of the opinion begins as follows: "Except in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any
case is the law of the state."55 Taken literally, the quotation indicates
that federal courts do not possess any lawmaking power, a position but-
tressed by Article I of the Constitution's conferral of the legislative
power upon Congress. 56 Some Supreme Court Justices and academic
commentators seem to follow this route, leading to debate over a possible
"New Erie Doctrine" barring substantive lawmaking by federal courts.
57
Counter arguments abound, of course, including the undeniable observa-
tion that the post-Erie Supreme Court has explicitly fashioned federal
common law in several important decisions.58
This interpretation of Erie is interesting, particularly to federal
courts teachers,59 but the main debate over Erie's fundamental basis has
52. See, eg., Akhil Amar, Book Review, 102 HARv. L. REv. 688, 694 (1989) (reviewing
HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988)).
53. In recent years a body of thought called "New Erie" has emerged in which Erie is
interpreted not only as a case about federalism, but also as a separation of powers case requir-
ing federal courts to refrain from making common law. See Doernberg, supra note 42, at 764-
70.
54. Id For a general discussion of the separation of powers aspect of the problem, see
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1985).
55. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.").
57. See Doernberg, supra note 42, at 764-70.
58. E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27 (1964) (applying
federal common law of international relation); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363, 367 (1943) (applying federal common law governing proprietary interests of United
States).
59. The issue of federal common law was the subject of papers presented at the 1991
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occurred between those who view it as primarily an individual rights-
fairness decision and those who view it as grounded primarily in federal-
ism. 6° The best-known elaboration of the fairness rationale is Professor
John Ely's celebrated article The Irrepressible Myth of Erie.61 Ely saw
the Court as concerned with "the unfairness of subjecting a person in-
volved in litigation with a citizen of a different state to a body of law
different from that which applies when his next door neighbor is involved
in similar litigation with a co-citizen."'62 The Brandeis opinion does re-
fer several times to the "discrimination" 63 that the existence of federal
general law under Swift engendered. For Ely the problem is the confer-
ral of unfair advantage on those litigants who can obtain federal
jurisdiction.
Ely discusses, but rejects, a somewhat different individual rights
reading of Erie that focuses on the unfairness to defendants of being sub-
ject to different bodies of law depending on whether a resident or nonres-
ident invoking diversity files suit.64 This is the "conflicting orders"
rationale to which Justice Harlan referred in Hanna.65 Ely rebuts it by
contending that potential defendants can usually manage to comply with
both orders by adhering to the more demanding one66 and by noting that
this sort of thing occurs all the time under modem conflicts thinking.67
Certainly concerns of individual rights and fairness play a role in
Erie. Judging by its language, however, the constitutional value under-
lying the opinion is federalism. Brandeis invokes the "autonomy and
independence of the States' 68 and asserts that under Swift the federal
courts "invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Consti-
tution to the several States."' 69 The Tenth Amendment is at the core of
the opinion.70 Indeed, although Ely downplays the federalism side of
meeting of the Federal Courts Section of The Association of American Law Schools, published
in 12 PAcE L. REV. 227 (1992). -
60. Maltz, supra note 13, at 237-39 (discussing arguments advanced by the two sides).
61. John H. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. RFV. 693 (1974).
62. Id at 712; see Peter Westin & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life For Erie After the
Death of Diversity?, 78 Mica L. REv. 311, 379 (1980) (discussing fairness rationale of Erie).
63. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-76 (1938).
64. Ely, supra note 61, at 712-13.
65. Id.; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). The
term "conflicting orders" is Professor Ely's.
66. Ely, supra note 61, at 711.
67. Id. Modem conflicts theories permit the law of more than one state to apply in a wide
variety of interstate transactions. See infra text accompanying notes 152-61.
68. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401
(1893)).
69. Id. at 80.
70. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
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Erie,7 1 other writers view this aspect of Erie as important. Professors
Earl Maltz and Alan Stein, for example, treat the case as an afirmnation
of the limited role of the national government.72 Under this view the
victim in the trial court was neither Congress nor the railroad (or analo-
gous plaintiffs who could not derive similar windfalls); it was the state
governments, whose sovereignty over matters of general private law had
been infringed. In sum, one can find in Erie application of the important
values of separation of powers, fairness, and federalism. Perhaps the de-
cision contains elements of all three, and its ambiguities add to its mys-
tique.7" If we treat these values separately, at least for purposes of
analysis, we can now examine the broader bearing of Erie on forum-
shopping.
D. Erie and Forum-Shopping
Is Erie a general condemnation of all forms of forum-shopping? At
least one commentator has argued that it is.74 The same reading is im-
plicit in Justice Harlan's views quoted at the beginning of this Article.75
Whenever a plaintiff can subject a defendant to two different sets of sub-
stantive laws there is a potential for uncertainty on the latter's part. But
a look at what goes on in our legal system indicates that one must distin-
guish between federal-state forum-shopping and state-state forum-shop-
ping. Compare the actions of Tompkins and Ferens. Each sought to
obtain the application of a favorable law; each went to federal court.
Tompkins failed because the federal court lacked "power" to provide it.
Ferens and his wife succeeded because the federal courts of the state in
which they sued were obliged to "replicate"76 the forum-shopping oppor-
tunities that state made available.
Indeed, it is Erie and its successors, particularly Klaxon Co. v. Sten-
tor Electric Manufacturing Co., 7 that made the whole ploy possible.
Erie tells the Mississippi federal court it cannot fashion federal law.
it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNST. amend,
X.
71. Ely, supra note 61, at 704 (suggesting that Erie discusses the Constitution and federal-
ism only to "demonstrate that its function in 'Erie concepts' is no different from its function
respecting other issues of federal powers").
72. Maltz, supra note 13, at 239-42; Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L. J.
1935, 1940-41 (1991).
73. See Amar, supra note 52, at 694-702.
74. Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
634, 641 (1974).
75. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
76. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1990).
77. 313 U.S. 487, 494-98 (1941); see supra note 17.
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Klaxon tells that court it must follow whatever choice of law rules Mis-
sissippi would utilize. It is obviously necessary to reconsider the funda-
mental principles of Erie to determine why the distinction between
impermissible and permissible forum-shopping is so strong. If we focus
on the separation of powers reading, the answer is easy. Federal-state
forum-shopping is bad because the plaintiff seeks to have the federal
court act beyond its powers. This reading has little or no bearing on the
state-state problem. Even if the state law plaintiff, as in Ferens, goes to a
federal court, he is only asking it to do what a court of that state could
do. Erie's prohibition on making federal common law simply does not
extend to the application of state common law in diversity cases.
The fairness-individual rights reading of Erie appears, at first glance,
to support a general anti-forum-shopping stance. The obvious argument
is Justice Harlan's "conflicting orders" contention with its overtones of
due process.78 If defendants should not be put in this position it cannot
make much difference whether the alternative set of orders comes from
the federal government or from a second state. Perhaps, however, the
whole conflicting orders danger is, in Ely's phrase, "overdrawn"79 be-
cause defendants can anticipate it. More importantly, the post-Eie
Supreme Court has repeatedly acted on the assumption that state-state
forum-shopping is not condemned by Erie. What is surprising is the rela-
tive lack of elaboration on why this is so; evidently the Court finds no
problem in this particular conflicting orders situation.
What about the fairness variant of the individual rights reading?
Does it bear on state-state forum-shopping? Suppose that Tompkins had
been accompanied by Smith and that her citizenship prevented her from
suing the railroad in federal court. It does seem unfair that he gets access
to a second body of law and she does not. Giving him that bonus is not
essential to the purpose of the diversity jurisdiction-providing a neutral
forum for litigants who might need it.80 This reading of Erie has no
bearing on state-state forum-shopping as long as all litigants can forum-
shop in all states on an equal basis. This was true for the Ferens. They
had the same statute of limitations to which any plaintiff in Mississippi
would have been subject.
The issue becomes increasingly complicated, and the fairness read-
ing of Erie seems more on point if some plaintiffs have a different law
applied than others based on their citizenship. This is a frequent occur-
78. In Erie Justice Brandeis noted that the rule of Swift had led to uncertainty about the
primary law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77 (1938); see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The
Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 489, 505-06 (1954).
79. Ely, supra note 61, at 711.
80. Id. at 713.
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rence under modem choice of law theories. A key variable is the pre-
sumed interests of different states in a transaction or occurrence with
multistate elements.81 Thus, if the driver in an accident injures two
guests from states with different statutes on the rights of automobile
guests, one of the plaintiffs may be able to shop for a forum that will give
more favorable law based on her citizenship. 2 Is this hypothetical any
less wrong than the Tompkins-Smith hypothetical? Arguably the answer
is yes because different citizenship brings about a difference in applicable
state law. A goal of the federal system is to leave private law largely in
state hands. Persons who do not like the law of their own state can act to
change it.83 Federal common law applied on a rolling basis depending on
the citizenship pattern of a particular case lacks this element of direct
political connection. Everyone is a federal citizen, but that is not the
variable that triggers federal law. (Perhaps coalitions of interest groups
with views on federal common law would emerge over time, but the pro-
cess would be highly diffuse at best.)
In the guest hypothetical, the guest from the pro-plaintiff state
would seek to sue in that state or in one that would follow its law. The
other guest would try to shop for a state that would disregard the limits
imposed by his law, perhaps on grounds of public policy. 4 State citizen-
ship may play a role in determining what opportunities for forum-shop-
ping exist, but whatever Erie had to say about fairness does not seem to
condemn this state of affairs.85 Erie is about fairness only to the extent
that Tompkins sought a law that bore no rational relationship to his citi-
zenship-a classic violation of equal protection principles. The same is
true of any plaintiff utilizing diversity jurisdiction to obtain a federal rule
of law. This suggests that the real problem with the law Tompkins
sought is that it would have come from a sovereign with no justification
for making it. In other words, Erie is primarily about federal versus state
lawmaking, and thus the fairness reading loses much of its force. One
can make this point another way by supposing that the post-Swift Court
81. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 5-6.
82. See, eg., Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 580, 249 N.E.2d 394,400-01,301 N.Y.S.2d
519, 528 (1969) (discussing possibility that two guests might each be subject to a different law).
83. Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 199-200, 480 N.E.2d 679, 686, 491
N.Y.S.2d 90, 96-97 (1985) ("[P]laintiffs ... have chosen to identify themselves" with the law of
the state of which they are citizens.).
84. I at 202-04, 480 N.E.2d at 685-87, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 98-100 (noting that a forum may
refuse to apply an otherwise controlling foreign law if it is against the public policy of the
forum state).
85. Professor Ely has raised the question whether conflicts rules favoring a state's own
residents over those of other states violate the values expressed in the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause. John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23
WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 173, 191 (1981).
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had opened the federal courts to all general law claimants regardless of
citizenship. This practice could not be attacked on fairness grounds-
everyone would have access to this law. The thrust of Erie is that no one
should have access to it.
Analysis of Erie as a federalism case is slightly complicated by un-
certainty over whether the Court viewed the subject of that case as be-
yond the power of the national government or only beyond the power of
its courts. If the subject is viewed as the tort duties of an interstate rail-
road then congressional power seems to exist.8 6 Perhaps the Court
viewed federal judicial power as not co-extensive with that of Congress.8 7
Perhaps the Court viewed the matter as a question of federal power over
the domain of general law. 88 Either way, the denial of federal judicial
power to fashion common law furthers important federalism values (as
well as illustrating how closely national separation of powers is linked to
those values).8 9 The states retain their primary role over private law.
Their courts are of equal status with their legislatures, and the federal
courts-which make law more quicdy and easily than the federal legisla-
tureg°-cannot displace them as private law articulators.
Viewed as a federalism decision, Erie's condemnation of federal-
state forum-shopping is essential to furthering Tenth Amendment values
and preserving the Hart and Wechsler concept of the "interstitial" nature
of federal law.9 Erie may not be applicable to state-state forum-shop-
ping at all. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,92 Justice Frankfurter said
that "[t]he operation of a double system of conflicting laws in the same
state is plainly hostile to the reign of law."9" It is Erie's version of feder-
alism that makes this so, not any other emanations from that case about
the rule of law. In sum, none of the three readings of Erie as a statement
of fundamental values appears to say much about state-state forum-shop-
86. Ely, supra note 61, at 701 n.51.
87. Doemberg, supra note 42, at 796-97.
88. Ely, supra note 61, at 704; see Weinberg, supra note 51, at 812.
89. Professor Redish has described federalism and separation of powers as "inextricably
intertwined." REDISH, supra note 49, at 30-31. Each doctrine serves to limit the scope of the
national government. Federalism disperses power to the states, while separation of power re-
strains the capacity of the national government to act in a sweeping manner.
90. George D. Brown, Federal Common Law and The Role of the Federal Courts in Pi
vate Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 235 (1992).
91. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WESESLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 533-34 (3d ed. 1988). The current edition of this classic casebook preserves
the original authors' view of the legal system as one in which state law is predominant and
federal law serves mainly to fill in gaps.
92. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Guaranty Trust rejected the notion of a separate set of federal
equity principles applicable in diversity cases.
93. Id. at 112.
1993]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ping. One can infer some condemnation from the defendant's rights
component of the fairness-individual rights reading, but it seems the
weakest link of that overall view of the case. Most arguments based on
defendants' expectations are weakened by the general circularity problem
that defendants can legitimately be held to duties that are imposed legiti-
mately on them. The railroad could expect to be sued in federal court by
plaintiffs seeking the benefit of the general law. What made that law
illegitimate was not surprise to the defendant, but the command of a
sovereign organ not authorized to make it. As for the fairness compo-
nent of the fairness-individual rights reading, I have argued above that it
has little bearing on state-state forum-shopping and that to a large extent
it collapses into the federalism reading.
Analysis might stop here, resting on the notion that Erie is a strong
condemnation of federal-state forum-shopping, but is essentially neutral
about the state-state variant. I would like to explore briefly the possibil-
ity that Erie actually favors this kind of forum-shopping. Erie envisages
a legal system in which the states play the primary role in developing
private law, and their courts are equal partners with their legislatures in
that development. State courts may be better suited for this role than
federal courts because they hear a broader range of disputes and because
their differing modes of organization-elected versus appointed judges,
for example-encourage nonuniform solutions to similar problems.
Thus, American common law will often vary from state to state, reflect-
ing both the differences in state values and the different organs used to
express those values. These differences comprise one of the hallmarks of
our system. As Brilmayer and Lee contend, we expect states to be differ-
ent.94 These differences help to ensure that states play their laboratory
role in bringing about growth and change in the law. Our federated com-
mon-law system-ensured by Erie-is far more dynamic than one in
which large chunks of common law come from the national courts, par-
ticularly if that brand of law is binding on all jurisdictions under the
Supremacy Clause.95
Does forum-shopping reinforce this system? Theoretical arguments
can be advanced that it reduces the pressure for national solutions by
giving highly motivated plaintiffs alternative channels of recourse, and
that change is accelerated because these plaintiffs push vanguard states
94. Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism:
A Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 833, 852 (1985).
95. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; Field, supra note 48, at 897 ("[T]he application of federal
common law should not in theory differ according to whether a state or federal court has
jurisdiction over a dispute.").
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even further in a pro-plaintiff direction. However, this may be a wash,
both because pushing some states too far in this direction may lead to
calls for pro-defendant national solutions, and because if these plaintiffs
could not go to other forums they would direct their energies to changing
the law where they could sue. Indeed, the law would change and grow
even if forum-shopping were eliminated. States would differ, and when-
ever a litigant in state A thought the law of state B preferable, she would
argue it to the courts of A. Cross-fertilization might actually increase.
Perhaps a federalistic argument for forum-shopping can be cast in eco-
nomic terms. Overtly pro-plaintiff states may seek to be the locus of law-
suits, viewing that as the source of some form of benefit.96 The kind of
free-wheeling federalism that Erie envisages encourages states' efforts to
maximize this perceived benefit.
It is not necessary, however, to analyze the matter in such rarified
terms. Erie encourages aggressive regulation by those states that wish to
conduct themselves that way. Permissive theories of choice of law are
the engine that drives much contemporary forum-shopping. They often
are based on the notion that a state's broad application of its own law
furthers the goals of that law.97 Thus, encouraging forum-shopping fur-
thers assertion of state interests. It helps states differ from one another.
Choice of law is seen as closely bound to substantive law. It can also be
seen as an important common-law field in and of itself, one of those fields
that Erie intended to leave in state hands. The system should take a
hospitable view of the existence of a number of conflicts theories, includ-
ing those that engender forum-shopping.
Perhaps one need not go this far. Perhaps Erie is simply neutral
about state-state forum-shopping. Even so, its presene demonstrates
that Erie is working. Of course, the practice of state-state forum-shop-
ping is controversial and has engendered a vigorous debate even though
it is one on which Erie has had little direct impact.
96. Justice Kennedy appeared to have envisioned this situation in his majority opinion in
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 528 (1989) ("Applying the transferee law, to the
extent that it discourages plaintiff-initiated transfers, might give States incentives to enact simi-
lar laws to bring in out-of-state business that would not be moved at the instance of the
plaintiff.").
97. See Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577, 583, 555 P.2d 997, 1002-03
(1976) (applying the forum state's law furthers Washington policy of deterring tortious
conduct).
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III. THE FORUM-SHOPPING DEBATE AND THE ROLE OF THE
NEw CONFUCTS
A. Anti-Forum-Shopping-The Classical Position
A vigorous debate over the merits of forum-shopping is taking place
within the American legal system. The widespread assumption that the
practice is harmful, however, has obscured the extent and even the exist-
ence of this debate. Thus, it makes sense to begin this section with an
examination of the anti-forum-shopping position, which I will refer to as
the classical view. It is found in academic commentary98 and in enough
state court opinions99 that one could conclude that a general presump-
tion against forum-shopping is an accepted principle of the common
law-a background understanding that guides the operation of the entire
legal system. Indeed, the classical view seems primarily to rest on im-
plicit assumptions, perhaps reflecting the notion that it is so obvious as
not to need justification. Nonetheless, with the aid of recent commen-
tary1"0 one can flesh out its bases.
At the heart of the classical view lies a desire for fairness to the
defendant. Forum-shopping is seen as subjecting the defendant to unan-
ticipated and perhaps unforeseeable risks. The classic statement is that
of Professor Hart who contended that the law can speak with "only one
ultimately authoritative voice... ,,"o One could state this desire in due
process terms, as Justice Harlan's Hanna concurrence suggests.102 How-
ever, the classical view appears to rest more on a view of fairness as a
sub-constitutional value, perhaps based on consideration of efficiency,
rather than on a constitutionally based view of defendants' rights. Thus
Professor Gottesman states that "the system frustrates rational planning.
Parties cannot know when they act what law governs their behavior, for
that depends upon post-act events such as the plaintiff's choice of fo-
98. See, eg., DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, STATE AND
FEDERAL 499 (6th ed. 1989) (discussing choice of law limits under Due Process and Full Faith
and Credit provisions of the Constitution).
99. E.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 189, 201, 480 N.E.2d 679, 686-87
(1985) (discussing policies that disallow forum shopping); Neumeier v. Keuhner, 31 N.Y.2d
121, 129, 286 N.E.2d 454, 458 (1972) (refusing to "sanction[ ] forum shopping [which would]
allow[ ] a party to select a forum which could give him a larger recovery than the court of his
own domicile."); see also Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 555, 432 P.2d 727, 730, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 31, 34 (1967) ("[If the choice of law were made to turn on events happening after the
accident, forum shopping would be encouraged.").
100. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 64-65 (assuming that choice of forum by plaintiff
breaches desired "neutrality"); Note, supra note 11, at 1680-89.
101. Hart, supra note 78, at 489.
.102. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (discussing possi-
ble "debilitating uncertainty in the planning of everyday affairs").
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rum. ' 0°  He sees this as imposing "significant costs."'
Systemic concerns such as a desire for efficient use of judicial re-
sources also underlie the classical view. Every forum is likely to be bi-
ased in favor of its own law, but a recurrent theme is that for any
particular lawsuit there is one natural or best forum where the case ought
to be brought.' For example, documents and witnesses may be located
primarily in one jurisdiction.'0 6 Justice Jackson's famous opinion in Gu/f
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert"7 noted that "[a]dministrative difficulties follow for
the courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of be-
ing handled at its origin."' ' On a more general level, he posited that
there was "a local interest in having localized controversies decided at
home."'0 9 The common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens"0 and its
federal codification in Title 28 § 1404(a)"' reflect this view of a natural
forum" 2 and also constitute powerful weapons that defendants can use
when plaintiffs seek to avoid that forum. Professor Gottesman argues
that plaintiffs' efforts to secure an advantageous law may entail the addi-
tional cost of extensive litigation over what law applies." 3 In sum, the
103. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 12.
104. Idk at 13.
105. See, e.g., Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 243 Minn. 58, 73, 66
N.W.2d 763, 773 (1954) (adopting forum non conveniens "to send the cause of action back
where... it belonged or to some other court where the trial could be more equitably held");
Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 691 (rex.) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing "sound doctrine" of forum non conveniens), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1990).
106. David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 443, 512-14 (1990) (proposing that courts consider only the location of docu-
ments and witnesses when deciding whether to transfer a case).
107. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In GulfOil, a resident of Virginia filed suit in the federal district
court of New York City against a Pennsylvania corporation that conducted business in both
Virginia and New York. The plaintiff sought damages for the destruction of his warehouse by
a fire the defendant negligently caused. The New York court recognized that it had diversity
jurisdiction, but, on forum non conveniens, refused to let the suit proceed in New York. Rec-
ognizing that all the events had taken place in Virginia, that most of the witnesses resided
there, and that the plaintiff could establish jurisdiction over the defendant in both state and
federal courts in Virginia, the Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by dismissing the suit. Id. at 509-12.
108. Id. at 508.
109. Id. at 509.
110. See generally Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of the
Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. Rlv. 781, 795-831 (1985) (tracing the development of
forum non conveniens in the United States).
111. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
112. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 110, at 842-44 (arguing that the court with the greatest
interest in the controversy should exercise jurisdiction).
113. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 11-12. In this way, the party who wins the race to the
courthouse can choose the law most favorable to her position. Id
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classical view insists that parties should take what the system gives them,
including the applicable law.
In addition to concerns of efficiency and fairness, there are other
strands to the classical position, which are sometimes related to these
core values. A widespread ability on the part of plaintiffs to forum-shop
may constitute an unfair tilt or outright bias of the system in their
favor.114 The ideal here is one of procedural neutrality in which the sys-
tem of adjective law furnishes the disputants a "level playing field" 1 on
which to resolve their disputes. Notions of substantive neutrality are also
at work: the legal system ought to strive for uniform rules that treat
similar cases in a similar manner.116 A Pennsylvania tort may be subject
to different rules than a Mississippi tort. But the Pennsylvania tort ought
to be subject to the same rule regardless of the state in which it is liti-
gated. The forum-shopper can be seen as one who manipulates loopholes
in the system to thwart both ideals of neutrality to hurt the defendant.
This manipulation may create popular doubt about the fairness of the
system. 7 Perhaps it is a form of unethical harassment of the defend-
ant1"8 Finally, forum-shopping may also create tensions in the federal
system. 119 Taken together these various rationales suggest that there is
considerable force behind an anti-forum-shopping principle, or at least a
presumption against the practice.
B. Pro-Forum-Shopping-The Revisionist Position
Advocates of forum-shopping are increasingly entering the debate. I
have labeled their view the revisionist position because only recently have
commentators come forward with sophisticated arguments to support
the practice of state-state forum-shopping. 2 ' One can find, however, a
114. See id. at 13.
115. Note, supra note 11, at 1685.
116. Id at 1685-89.
117. Id at 1690.
118. Id
119. Cf Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323-24 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens noted that application of forum law may violate the Full Faith and Credit
Clause by infringing on the sovereignty of an interested state. To take this position it is neces-
sary to construe the Clause's reference to "the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings"
of the states as extending to their common-law doctrines. Id. at 320 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1). Justice Stevens argued that the clause "should not
invalidate a state court's choice of forum law unless that choice threatens the federal interest in
national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of another State." Id. at
323 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 87-94; Note, supra note 11 at 1695-96. Writing in 1989,
Professor Juenger described the entire subject of forum-shopping as a neglected area. Juenger,
supra note 3, at 553-54.
[Vol. 71
FOR UM SHOPPING
recurrent theme in common-law opinions that is directly supportive of
the practice: the maxim that the plaintiff is master of his forum.121 As
the maxim suggests, courts have sometimes been willing to look at the
question of forum selection solely from the plaintiff's perspective and to
let her call the shots without focusing on the precise reason that the
plaintiff should have this power. Much of the recent formulation of the
revisionist position represents an elaboration of this perspective focusing
on the law to be applied.
The starting point for revisionists is a general rebuttal of the argu-
ments that are made against forum-shopping. Professor Ely's critique of
the Harlan-Hart fairness thesis122 is an important component of a revi-
sionist defense of forum-shopping. Defendants subject to differing stan-
dards of law can adjust their conduct in anticipation of suit under the
higher standard, as long as the rules in question do not order mutually
inconsistent activities.1 23 This is particularly true of large interstate busi-
ness entities, and it is primarily these entities that are the likely targets of
forum-shopping. 124 Evolving rules of general jurisdiction may well sub-
ject them to suit in all fifty states. 125 Knowing this they can plan
accordingly.
Revisionism also calls into question the classical position's heavy re-
liance on the concept of a natural forum. In interstate situations there
may be several forums where elements of the litigation are centered such
that each could be the natural one. Even though one forum will often
have the stronger claim, a cornerstone of modem theories of personal
jurisdiction is the possibility of suit in more than one state.126 As Justice
Brennan put it, "The defendant has no constitutional entitlement to the
best forum or, for that matter, to any particular forum."' 127 On a more
general level, efficiency-based arguments against the expenditure of re-
sources caused by forum-shopping must contend with the possibility that
these expenditures are offset by social gains from the plaintiff's choice of
121. See The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
122. Ely, supra note 61, at 714-17. The Harlan-Hart thesis is that it is unfair to subject
individuals to two different sets of standards governing a single activity.
123. Stein, supra note 72, at 1951.
124. Note, supra note 11, at 1692 (noting that businesses can exercise forum-shopping
power by deciding where to incorporate).
125. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 10. For an excellent discussion and critique of general
jurisdiction, see Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610,
630-43 (1988).
126. See CoUND et al., supra note 41, at 120 n.1; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462, 483 n.26 (1985) ("[Minimum contacts analysis presupposes that two or more
states may be interested in the outcome of a dispute.").
127. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 301 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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a law that permits recovery.128 At this level the debate seems to encoun-
ter "nearly insurmountable philosophical and empirical barriers."' 29
As for the notion that forum-shopping produces an unfair pro-plain-
tiff bias, revisionists might well reply that those who advance it simply
want to introduce a pro-defendant bias. 130 The process cannot be neu-
tral. As Professor Louise Weinberg puts it, "It would be comforting to
believe that taking a litigational advantage from plaintiffs simply levels
the playing field. But we have seen that litigation has little neutral
ground. A single litigation is a zero-sum game."' 131 This reasoning un-
dercuts notions of procedural as well as substantive neutrality. 132 In-
deed, the classical aversion to forum-shopping may reflect formalist
assumptions about an even-handed, above-the-battle legal system that are
weakened seriously by modem, realist analysis.
133
Revisionists can poke other holes in the classical position. For ex-
ample, whether the general public knows or cares about lawyers' tactics
in the arcane field of choice of law is open to question. 134 Rather than
harassing the defendant, the plaintiff's lawyer who seeks out favorable
law may be seen as fulfilling the duty to represent one's client zeal-
ously. 135 Similarly, arguments based on federalism may be an illusion.
While the state whose law is not applied loses a degree of sovereignty, it
is offset by the forum's gains in governmental power through the ability
to apply its law. The revisionists might well stop here, contending that
they have presented enough viable arguments to rebut fully any genera-
lized presumption against forum-shopping. They can also point to the
frequency of forum-shopping as evidence that courts tolerate and even
approve the practice, and that invocations of an anti-forum-shopping
128. Note, supra note 11, at 1692.
129. Id. at 1692 n.116.
130. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 64, 71.
131. Id at 71.
132. See Note, supra note 11, at 1687-89 (discussing how advantages accruing to both sides
can undercut the ideal of neutrality in the legal system).
133. Id at 1685-87.
The realists recognized that legal decision makers are influenced by political, per-
sonal and nonstatutory and non-precedent-based considerations.... [I]t remains dif-
ficult for the legal system to confront [these factors]. Acceptance of forum shopping
would require that the legal system recognize its own insurmountable systemic de-
pendence on such "nonlegal" considerations. This result threatens not only the con-
cept of the rule of law, but also the image of apolitical neutrality that the legal system
tries to create.
Id at 1687.
134. Id. at 1684 n.58.
135. Id at 1688-90 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7
(1981)); Juenger, supra note 3, at 571-72.
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principle are only lip-service, usually designed to justify a result the court
wants to reach anyway.
136
It is important to note, however, that the revisionist position can be
stated in far more positive terms. Forum-shopping can be viewed as a
desirable practice, furthering important interests of the plaintiff and ad-
vancing a number of systemic goals as well. The plaintiff and the defend-
ant may well not stand on equal ground in terms of their choice of law.
The plaintiff seeks to invoke a substantive law under which her claim will
be upheld. As a general matter the legal system favors the provision of a
remedy for those who seek such goals as the enforcement of contracts
and compensation for injuries.13 7 One commentator describes the legal
system as committed "to party-driven litigation and to the provision of a
remedy for every injury," 138 and contends that "[t]ranscending the selec-
tive and formalistic aversion to forum-shopping can enhance the possibil-
ity of pluralistic methods of remedying wrongs."'139 In other words, the
plaintiff is someone whom "the system" wants to win the contest.
Plaintiffs may derive other, less tangible benefits from being able to
choose the forum. These can be grouped loosely under the heading of
"litigant autonomy."" As Professor Judith Resnik states, "Implicit in
litigants autonomy is concern about respect for individual dignity. To
enhance dignity, government should provide individuals with choices
about protection and assertion of their rights."'' To the extent that liti-
gation serves the political function of establishing and articulating soci-
ety's legal norms, 42 choosing one's forum can even be seen as a form of
participation in the political process.
Beyond the individual plaintiff's well being, systemic values are im-
plicated. Professor Weinberg depicts the plaintiff as a "private attorney
general."' 43 That is, society not only wants justice in the individual case,
but also the deterrence'" that victory will set in motion. Apart from any
136. Note, supra note 11, at 1684-85.
137. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 67.
138. Note, supra note 11, at 1695.
139. Id. at 1696.
140. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 306 (1988). It should be noted that Professor Chemerinsky is using
the term largely in the context of public law litigation.
141. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 847 (1984).
142. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) (arguing that a
settlement is not a perfect substitute for a judgment because settlement does not give force to
the values of authoritative texts).
143. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 70.
144. Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private Rights of Ac- "
tion, 34 VILL. L. Rv. 429, 456-59 (1989) (asserting that the effect of deterrence requires
application of authority by either government or private litigants).
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effect on the substantive law, it may be that plaintiffs perform an impor-
tant social function simply by bringing suit. Our society needs lawsuits
to further shared goals and to provide the vehicle for elaborating
them. 4 ' Forum-shopping is an acceptable form of incentive to plaintiffs.
These arguments represent what might be called the cutting edge of
the forum-shopping debate. They are provocative, but not definitive.
Whether lawsuits should be encouraged, for example, or viewed as a ma-
joi social problem is the subject of considerable controversy. 146 Surely
they are a mixed blessing. On the substantive side, I am not convinced
that one can discuss the values of "the sovereign" 147 as manifestly pro-
plaintiff in an area like torts where there are fifty state sovereigns with
wide ranges of opinion on how to strike the balance between plaintiffs
and defendants. Where one stands on forum-shopping may be the prod-
uct of where one stands on substantive law, a point to which I will return
in Part IV. One commentator states that "[a]ssuming that forum-shop-
ping plaintiffs invoke substantive rules that are socially beneficial, the net
effect of forum shopping is greater enforcement of the law and protection
of plaintiffs legitimate interests." 14 A lot rides on the words "assuming"
and "legitimate." Where one stands on forum-shopping may also reflect
where one stands with respect to current theories of choice of law. These
theories help make the broad extent of the practice possible. 149 They also
provide an important doctrinal justification for injecting a pro-plaintiff
tilt into the system of interstate adjudication.
C. Pro-Forum-Shopping-The Pivotal Role of the New Conflicts
Professor Weinberg describes the current mechanics of interstate lit-
145. See Fiss, supra note 142, at 1085; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
W1hat We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 69-71 (1983) (viewing contemporary trends in litigation
as society's adaptive response to changing conditions like an increasingly mobile and better
educated public).
146. Recently a number of conservative authors have criticized the amount of litigation in
American society. Walter Olson's writings typify this school of thought. In his book, The
Litigation Explosion, he declares that the increase in litigation is the result of a deliberate
experiment in deregulation which has been "a disaster, an unmitigated failure." He continues,
"The unleashing of litigation in its full fury has done cruel, grave harm and little lasting good."
WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION-WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UN-
LEASHED THE LAWsuIT 2 (1991).
147. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 65.
148. Note, supra note 11, at 1693 (emphasis added).
149. Juenger, supra note 3, at 558-59. Forum-shopping for law advantages, the type of




igation as a "forum shopping system."' 50 A number of factors converge
to make things easy for plaintiffs. These include relaxed standards of
personal jurisdiction, the general obligation of states to provide a forum,
choice of law theories that encourage the use of forum law, and minimal
scrutiny by the Supreme Court of state choice of law decisions.' 5 ' In this
subsection I will focus on the pivotal role of modem choice of law theo-
ries. Academic writing in this field has helped fuel courts' inherent ten-
dency to prefer their own law. Even when judges would probably have
done so on their own, the commentators have furnished them with a
handy justification. Modem conflicts thinking is largely pro-plaintiff in
result. To some extent it rests on assumptions about substantive law that
are also pro-plaintiff.
Much has been written on the "new conflicts"' 52 and I will treat it
briefly. Because the field is so amorphous, a degree of generality is neces-
sary. The essence of the development is a rejection of the old conflicts as
developed by Professor Joseph Beale and embodied in the First Restate-
ment. 53 The old conflicts sought to have all jurisdictions apply the same
law to a given set of facts, based on where certain events occurred. Key
aspects of the new conflicts include challenging of the goal of uniform-
ity;'54 asserting that any choice of law inquiry must include the content
of competing laws, not just territorial considerations;' 55 analyzing the in-
terests of the various states potentially concerned with any transac-
tion; 56 and acknowledging that a forum's preference for its own law is a
valid part of the choice process. 57 The new conflicts succeeded in erod-
ing the authority of the First Restatement, but could not produce a single
methodology to replace it. There is some uncertainty as to how many
methodologies are now in use, but there appear to be at least four. 58
150. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 68.
151. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 10; Weinberg, supra note 4, at 68. Professor Weinberg
notes as additional factors the enforceability and preclusive effect of any judgment the plaintiff.
secures. Id.
152. For a useful introduction and citation of authorities, see Gottesman, supra note 3, at
2-9.
153. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLIcTS LAW § 4, at 6-7 (4th ed. 1986).
154. Juenger, supra note 3, at 554.
155. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173,
208 (1933).
156. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 5-6.
157. LEFLAR et al., supra note 153, § 106, at 295. Advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interest is one of Professor Leflar's five frequently cited choice-influencing considera-
tions. It should be noted that Professor Leflar does not advocate automatic application of
forum law. I& at 297.
158. Gene R. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflections on
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN. L. REv. 327, 340-41 (1982). Shreve notes "four
choice-of-law methodologies now generally in use: the late Professor Currie's government in-
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The result is a cornucopia of opportunities for forum-shopping in
any case in which there is more than one state with an interest in the
matter that might justify application of its law. The plaintiff's shopping
will consist generally of a twofold search for a jurisdiction with a
favorable substantive law and a choice of law theory that will point to the
application of that law. Any of the modern methodologies would facili-
tate this endeavor, including the seemingly neutral Second Restate-
ment.159 That the plaintiff may be able to choose among different
theories enhances the range of options.1" Indeed, the plaintiff may not
even be seeking the forum's substantive law if its choice of law will do the
trick. As Professor Gottesman explains, "A knowledgeable counsel,
before filing suit, can survey the choice of law rules of the states in which
service can be effected, and sue in the state whose choice of law rules are
likely to result in application of the substantive law most favorable to her
client's cause." '161
The new conflicts is thus pro-plaintiff in result. To some extent it
seems pro-plaintiff in intent. For example, there is considerable interest
in applying the "better rule of law" in choice of law cases. 162 The con-
cept is generally associated with Professor Leflar, who describes the mat-
ter this way: "When a court finds itself faced with a choice between...
anachronistic laws hanging on in one state, and realistic modern rules in
another state, both states having substantial connection with the facts, it
would be surprising if the court's choice did not incline toward the supe-
rior law."'16  It would also not be surprising if a court taking this ap-
proach viewed as better the law favoring the plaintiff. There are also
suggestions in academic writing of a meta-law, a legal system reflecting
"the totality of values produced and distributed in the national commu-
nity."" Academics, at least, may feel strongly that this broader law
terest analysis, Professor Leflar's choice influencing considerations, the First Restatement,
[and] the Second Restatement." Id. at 341; see Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 538 &
n.2 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the difference among state choice of law principles
as "kaleidoscopic" and noting the existence of 10 different theories).
159. Shreve, supra note 158, at 343-44.
160. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 9-10 (observing that there is a "tendency in some states to
slide back and forth between approaches in reaction to the equities of the cases before them").
161. Idk at 10.
162. E.g., Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966). In Clark, a New Hampshire
spouse sued her husband based on an accident in Vermont. Id. at 206. The court chose the
more favorable New Hampshire law, based in part on its view that that rule was better. Id. at
210.
163. LEFLAR et al., supra note 153, § 107, at 299.
164. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS
284 (2d ed. 1989) (quoting Luther L. McDougal III, Comprehensive Interest Analysis Versus
Reformulated Governmental Interest Analysis: An Appraisal in the'Context of Choice-of-Law
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should advance the values that plaintiffs present. One can find a forceful
articulation of underlying pro-plaintiff views in the work of Professor
Weinberg. She argues that plaintiffs will choose the law that is better,165
not just better for them, but also for the long-term interests of the
broader community. "When the forum subordinates its own law to some
foreign defense, it opts against deterring, regulating, punishing, or even
declaring wrongful the alleged injuring and violative conduct of the de-
fendant." 166 Thus, "a structured, habitual avoidance of forum law in
favor of law relied on by defendants means a structural bias against law
enforcement."
167
Not everyone views the pro-plaintiff tilt of the new conflicts favora-
bly. Aspects of the new conflicts have been criticized, to cite only one
writer, as non neutral, "loose-textured" and "easily... manipulated,"
favoring forum bias and "parochialism," and "amenable to result-ori-
ented judicial manipulation." '168 A broad debate over the general validity
of the new conflicts is taking place. This section has focused on two sets
of players in the past and present debate: the academics and the state
courts. However, the Supreme Court has played an equally important
role: It has let the whole thing happen. Allstate,'69 for example, consti-
tutes what one set of writers describes as "surely the most expansive
choice of law decision in Supreme Court history."' 70  Without this
hands-off attitude forum-shopping would not be able to flourish. This
appears to be a surprising stand for a staunchly conservative Court. The
remainder of this Article explores that proposition.
IV. PRIVATE LAW PLAINTIFFS IN A CONSERVATIVE COURT-THE
IDEOLOGIES OF LITIGATION
A. A Conservative Supreme Court-The Public Law Dimensions
The proposition that a conservative majority is now in control of the
Supreme Court has been so widely accepted as to constitute a truism.
Despite the emergence in the 1991-1992 term of a moderate-centrist
group with considerable power and influence,' 71 the Court's views re-
Problems Concerning Contributory and Comparative Negligence, 26 UCLA L. REv. 439
(1979)) (the quoted passage appears to have been omitted from the article as published in
UCLA LAw REVIEW).
165. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 66.
166. Id. at 70.
167. Id at 71.
168. Shreve, supra note 158, at 342-44.
169. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
170. Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 94, at 849.
171. Linda Greenhouse, Moderates on Court Defy Predictions, N.Y. TIMEs, July 5, 1992,
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main generally conservative. Some disagreement exists over how far the
Court moved in this direction under the Chief Justiceship of Warren
Burger.172 Even if it did not bring about a "counter-revolution," 173 the
High Court of the 1970s and early 1980s moved far enough away from
the positions and approaches of the Warren Court that it can be labeled
as somewhat conservative. The conservative triumph came in the late
1980s with the elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief Justice and the
appointment of conservative Justices by Presidents Reagan and Bush.
These Presidents set out to change the direction of the Court and to roll
back the Warren legacy."7 Whether its key point is the arrival of Justice
Anthony Kennedy,175 or that of Justice David Souter,176 the transforma-
tion was viewed as largely complete even before Justice Clarence Thomas
joined the Court. 17 7 Again, the emergence of the moderate-centrist
group may require some tempering of the notion of a transformation.
While these statements receive general acceptance, they mask con-
siderable uncertainty about what a "conservative" Supreme Court
means. Obviously the terms "conservative" and "liberal" pose defini-
tional problems in any context.'78 Decisions by the current Court often
show the conservative Justices at odds with each other. 179 Conservative
§ 4 (Magazine), at 1; Dick Lehr, Centrist Troika Slows the Right on High Court, BOSTON
GLOBE, July 3, 1992, at I. These authors describe Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter as
the moderate centrists. For valuable academic analyses, see Robert H. Smith, Justice Souter
Joins the Rehnquist Court: An Emperical Study of Supreme Court Voting Patterns, 41 KAN. L.
REv. 1 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Forward: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106
HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992).
172. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND THE CONSTITUTION 258-61 (1990)
(describing the power of centrists on the Burger Court).
173. See, eg., Anthony Lewis, Foreword to THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (Vincent A. Blasi ed., 1982) (noting the Burger Court's respect
for stare decisis).
174. See HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURT 3-9 (1988) (noting President Rea-
gan's opportunity to appoint more judges than any other president in history).
175. See Russell W. Galloway, The Court's Shifting To the Right, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 2,
1989, at 6 (characterizing Justice Kennedy as having the second most conservative voting
record during his first full term).
176. See Russell W. Galloway, With David Souter Newly Seated on the High Court, Con-
servative JudicialActivists Will Have a Heyday, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 17, 1990, at 6 (characteriz-
ing Justice Souter as the crucial fifth vote for conservative judicial activism).
177. To liberal critics, at least, Justice Thomas has emerged as the arch conservative. See
Justice Thomas, the Freshman, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, § 4, at 10 (criticizing Justice Thomas
as injudicious and characterizing his arguments as boilerplate attacks on political opponents).
178. See, eg., Robert Glennon, Will the Real Conservatives Please Stand Up?, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1990, at 49.
179. E.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2875 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (In the opinion of the Court, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter "rattle off a collec-
tion of adjectives that simply decorate a value judgment and conceal a political choice."); id. at
2883 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (analogizing the Casey decision to Dred Scott).
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legal theorists disagree sharply over such issues as whether a jurispru-
dence of original intent is possible; whether the judiciary should be ag-
gressive in its protection of economic liberties;I" ° and whether or not
judicial conservatism should distrust the results of majoritarian political
processes.18 ' Despite the lack of a unified conservative philosophy on all
issues, I believe that one can give an accurate general outline of the
Court's conservative bent, as that term is used in describing American
judicial institutions, based on the Court's decisions interpreting the Con-
stitution. Indeed, attempts to analyze the Court as an ideological entity
have focused almost exclusively on this aspect of its activities.18 2 This
emphasis is not surprising both because constitutional law is the most
visible part of the Court's work and because the Court does not generally
perform common-law functions as do state courts.
1 8 3
Significant themes in conservative legal doctrineinclude the general
notion of a restrained or nonactivist judiciary, the importance of original
intent in construing any constitutional provision, the central roles which
the structural values of federalism and separation of powers play in the
constitutional scheme, and the inherent legitimacy of majoritarian deci-
sion-making processes.184 These principles are not applied by the Court
with perfect consistency, but they recur enough to produce patterns of
results both in terms of the availability of federal courts and the results
public law litigants are likely to receive there. Tightening access to the
federal courts is an important element of Burger-Rehnquist Court juris-
prudence,185 and a clear reversal of Warren Court tendencies. A restric-
tive approach to standing is the most widely discussed component of this
development, including a major decision last term restricting standing in
environmental suits.' 86 Liberal critics have lambasted the standing cases
180. See generally STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT v. THE CONSTITTION 47
(1986) (discussing the tension between the general conservative distrust of judicial activism
and the desire of some conservatives for aggressive judicial protection of economic liberties).
181. Id. at 21-37.
182. See, eg., SCHWARTZ, supra note 174, at 4-7.
183. For purposes of this discussion, I will put to one side the question of whether constitu-
tional adjudication is a form of common law making.
184. For an important articulation of conservative legal doctrine sounding many of these
themes in the early stages of the Reagan Administration, see PATRICK B. McGuIGAN & RAN-
DALL R. RADER, A BLUEPRINT FOR JUDICIAL REFORM 1-107, 181-281 (Patrick B. McGui-
gan & Randall R. Rader eds., 1981).
185. See generally Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and
the Manipulation of Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 321, 327-45 (1989) (reviewing
methods the Court has used to limit the scope of federal jurisdiction).
186. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137-40 (1992); cf. Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187-89 (1990). These cases are important in their emphasis
on the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate individualized harm. For example, in National Wild-
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as embodying the "agenda" of the new right. 187 Conservative commen-
tators had long sought this result 188 and at an earlier point had even
sought to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts over constitutionally sen-
sitive matters.1 89
Despite attempts to limit the federal judicial function, cases and is-
sues still manage to end up in court one way or another. Thus, in at-
tempting to understand the Supreme Court's conservatism, it is
necessary to focus on the substantive results it reaches. The significant
themes of a conservative Court are a deference to majoritarian processes
and a tendency to interpret individual rights restrictively when a litigant
asserts that majoritarian processes have infringed upon a constitutional
right. Litigants asserting such rights won some notable victories in the
1991-1992 term,190 but the overall trend has been the other way. Well-
known recent cases include the upholding of restrictions on the availabil-
ity of abortions,191 validating a locality's banning of totally nude danc-
ing,192 and a broadening of police ability to search without a valid
warrant. 1 93 The rights of criminal defendants have been a frequent tar-
get. In 1991, for example, the Court upheld custodial detention of up to
forty-eight hours for suspects arrested without a warrant. 194 The con-
servative majority has authored a series of decisions restricting the ability
of state prisoners to seek review of their convictions via federal habeas
life Federation, use of a large area of land did not create an interest in preventing harm to a
particular tract within that area. National Wildlife, 110 S. Ct. at 3189.
187. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 635, 659 (1985).
188. Doug Bandow, The Conservative Judicial Agenda: 4 Critique, in ECONOMIC LIBER-
TIES AND THE JUDICIARY 257, 265 (James A. Dom & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
189. See generally Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdic-
tion: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 895-922 (1984)
(discussing the renewed interest in unsettled constitutional issues and the wave of "jurisdic-
tion-stripping bills" introduced in Congress between 1981 and 1982).
190. E.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2796 (1992) (holding that a public school's
requirement that students silently stand during "nonsectarian" prayer at graduation ceremony
violates the Establishment Clause).
191. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2796 (1992) (upholding provisions of
Pennsylvania's abortion statute regarding informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period, parental
consent, and record-keeping but invalidating a spousal notification requirement).
192. Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2457 (1991) (holding that an Indiana
public decency law prohibiting totally nude dancing does not violate the First Amendment).
193. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (recognizing constitutionality of a
good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
194. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 1670 (1991) (holding that judi-




corpus.19 One liberal critic, surveying the wreckage, declares that "[t]he
Court already has damaged severely the constitutional right of privacy
and reproductive autonomy, turned the clock back on civil rights, re-
stricted free speech and free exercise of religion, and weakened the rule
against unreasonable searches and seizures."'
196
But what makes these decisions "conservative," other than the tau-
tology that they are the product of a conservative Court? The tautology
has some usefulness. These are not the sort of decisions that we expected
or received from the Warren Court. Beyond that, one can say that these
decisions generally are congruent with the conservative views of the elec-
torate that voted for Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush. The
Court's deference to political processes translates, whether coincidentally
or not, into the upholding of the results those processes reach. The
processes may have attained those results explicitly, in the form of laws,
or implicitly, for example, in the approval of strong police measures to
curb crime. The message to the losers in those processes is that they
cannot turn to the federal courts as an additional governmental arena in
which to fight the entire battle again in the name of the Constitution.
The majority really does rule.
Liberals, of course, criticize the Court for being too conservative. A
recurrent theme of these criticisms is that the Court's results inevitably
produce harm to certain groups, not just to random sets of losing parties.
The Court is often accused of having an "agenda" that targets a spec-
trum of politically underrepresented and powerless classes. 19 7 Restric-
tive jurisdictional doctrines, for example, are viewed as anti-civil rights,
harmful to public interest litigants, and designed to work "against the
disadvantaged and powerless classes, those who cannot afford a better
attorney, the have-nots as opposed to the haves." 198 This criticism,
whether or not one accepts its premises and tone, helps capture the es-
sence of the Burger-Rehnquist Court's conservatism: It has downgraded
the role of litigation in the federal courts as an instrument of social
change and redistributive efforts on behalf of those who lack power in the
political process. This stance reinforces the existing social order, and en-
sures that any changes to it will take place slowly and that those changes
will be acceptable to current majorities.
195. See, eg., Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. "REv. 797, 798-814
(1992).
196. Russell W. Galloway, Balance of Power, A.B.A. J., May 1991, at 74, 75.
197. Levit, supra note 185, at 321-22.
198. Id. at 363 (footnotes omitted).
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B. Public Law Forum-Shopping
In some of the Court's public law decisions we can discern a possible
connection between conservatism and attitudes towards forum-shopping.
There is a direct relationship between rights and the ability to enforce
them. Doctrines that prevent or limit judicial enforcement of a right
have a significant effect on the value and force of that right. Considera-
ble attention has been focused on decisions of the Burger-Rehnquist
Court that deprive federal rights asserters of a federal judicial forum, but
do permit enforcement in a state court.199 The different forums may well
take different views of the nature and extent of the right involved. Thus
it has been argued, notably by Professor Michael Wells,2co that the
Court's supposed jurisdictional doctrines are a form of de facto control
over the content of the underlying right. One way of looking at these
cases is that the persons against whom these doctrines operate represent
what might be called public law forum-shoppers. They seek the federal
forum precisely because they perceive it as more likely to vindicate the
federal right.2 0 1
The cases can be divided into three groups. Some plaintiffs attempt
a preemptive strike against the state judicial machinery before it is used
against them. Preemptive strikers run the risk of being hit with Younger
abstention.202 If the state judicial proceeding is viewed as already pend-
ing and certain other criteria are met,20 3 the federal plaintiff will be re-
mitted to the state court system for assertion, as a defendant, of her
199. See generally Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L.
REv. 1141, 1251 (1988) (discussing the tension between nationalist ideals, which point toward
hearing such cases in a federal court, and federalism ideals, which emphasize the role of state
courts).
200. See Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REv. 283, 327 (1988) ("[T]he
Court... can, at a very general level, enforce changes in their perception of the proper balance
to be drawn between the values underlying competing state and individual claims in constitu-
tional cases."). For a view of the role of state courts in enforcing individual rights, see Sympo-
sium, "The Law of the Land" The North Carolina Constitution and State Constitutional Laws,
70 N.C. L. REv. 1701 (1992).
201. See Wells, supra note 200, at 285-86. To the extent that the federal courts are viewed
as systematically more favorable to federal claims, the public law plaintiff resembles the private
law plaintiff shopping between different laws.
202. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971), the federal plaintiffs sought to enjoin
state officials from proceeding with prosecutions pending against them. The Supreme Court
held that principles of comity and federalism stand as a strong bar to any such injunctive relief
in federal court. See supra note 6.
203. See generally CHARLEs A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 52A, at 320-
30 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing the Younger doctrine and related case law). The other criteria are
the presence of the plaintiff as a party in the state proceeding, the presence of an important




federal claim. There are several justifications for the Younger doctrine,
but the Court usually rests its invocation on grounds of comity and feder-
alism, particularly the ability of state courts to adjudicate federal
claims.2 4
A second group comprises cases in which federal plaintiffs (or peti-
tioners) seek a second bite of the apple with respect to matters already
litigated in a state court.20 5 The most familiar example involves use of
the federal habeas corpus petition to seek federal trial court review of a
state criminal conviction."z 6 Another example is attempts by federal civil
rights plaintiffs to litigate claims that might have been raised in an earlier
state proceeding, or to relitigate particular issues decided by a state court
which are relevant to those claims.2"7 The Court is quite hostile to see-
ond-bite plaintiffs. Its substantial restriction of habeas corpus is well-
known. The extensive line of cases rests on such themes as the special
role of state courts in criminal matters, the general importance of respect
for state courts, the importance of the trial as the place for the assertion
and decision of claims, and general notions of conservation of judicial
resources.218  In the civil context, res judicata has the same negative
effect on the efforts of second-biters.
A third group is composed of some individuals who are classic con-
current jurisdiction civil rights plaintiffs. These are individuals with fed-
eral claims against whom no state proceedings are pending or have been
brought. They wish to assert their claims in a federal trial court and seek
either damages or equitable relief. Many of these plaintiffs get that fo-
rum. However, despite the availability of concurrent jurisdiction and the
generalized remedy provided by § 1983,209 they may be blocked by a ju-
risdictional doctrine and sent to state court. The most important of these
204. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 602 (1975). In Huffman the Court extended
Younger abstention to cases which are not criminal prosecutions. In that case it ordered defer-
ence to a state civil nuisance proceeding. Id.
205. In some situations, the state disposition is that of an administrative tribunal.
206. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
207. E.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (holding that the previously litigated
issue regarding the validity of a police search collaterally estopped defendant from bringing a
civil rights action based on the search).
208. See, eg., Keeny v. Tamayo-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715, 1718 (1992) (stating that rules
deserve "respect" and that federal habeas litigation "places a heavy burden on scarce judicial
resources"); McClesky v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1469 (1991) (stating that federal attacks on
state convictions frustrate state's sovereign powers and good faith efforts to uphold constitu-
tional rights while placing a "heavy burden on scarce judicial resources"); Francis v. Hender-
son, 425 U.S. 536, 538-39 (1976) (discussing the "appropriate exercise' of the federal courts'
power to entertain applications for writ of habeas corpus).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute is the basic authorization for suits against state
and local governments and officials for deprivation of rights secured by the federal Constitu-
tion and laws. Jurisdiction over § 1983 suits is available under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
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doctrines is the Eleventh Amendment.21 ° The current Court views suits
against states in federal court based on federal law as a significant intru-
sion on state sovereignty.2 1 It has interpreted the Amendment broadly,
diminishing the availability of monetary relief against state officials.212
There are other doctrines that can send the classic civil rights plaintiff to
state court, notably Pullman abstention,21 3 although its status in the cur-
rent Court is uncertain.21 a
In all three categories of cases, the Court's actions limit federal-state
forum-shopping by public law plaintiffs. On the surface the governing
policies do not have much to do with the anti-forum-shopping side of
Erie. The plaintiff is not trying to surprise the defendant by getting a
different law, nor are some plaintiffs seeking favorable law not available
to other analogous plaintiffs. It is true that the Court invokes "federal-
ism," but the ideal is different from the regulatory federalism fostered by
Erie. Erie emphasizes the primacy of the states in developing private law
norms. In the public law forum-shopping cases the norm comes from the
federal government, and the federal courts will remain the primary ex-
positors of that norm. What the Court's jurisdictional doctrines reflect is
concern for the role of state courts as supervisors of their governments
and the role of the federal courts in supervising both. Thus, what links
these cases with Erie is a federalism-based desire to preserve the status of
state courts against incursion by federal tribunals.
Still, the public law cases do involve some elements of forum-shop-
ping. To an extent the Court's attitude toward them may reflect notions
analogous to preference of the natural forum. The cases are viewed as
belonging in state court, and the Supreme Court rebuffs plaintiffs' at-
tempts to maximize their chance of winning by shopping for a different
210. U.S. CONST. amend XI. ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.").
211. See generally George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the
Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEo. L.J. 363, 364-68 (1985) (arguing that in Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 926 (1985), the Court tacitly rejected the view that "Congress
has the authority to remove whatever protection the states do receive under the eleventh
amendment").
212. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars a federal court from ordering retroactive payment of benefits offered under the
federal-state program of Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled).
213. The doctrine takes its title from Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498-
500 (1941), in which the Court stated that federal court abstention is required when state law
is uncertain and state court's clarification of state law might make a federal court's constitu-
tional ruling unnecessary.
214. See George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Powers Collide-Rethink-
ing Younger Abstention, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 114, 151-52 (1990).
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forum. Perhaps the results in public law cases illustrate a general aver-
sion to forum-shopping as defined in this Article. After all, plaintiffs'
desire for federal court is based on the hope of a different view of the law.
It should also be noted that the Court attaches little value to any notion
of litigant choice. Indeed, one commentator has called for a revision of
doctrine in this area based on the principle of litigant choice.215 As dis-
cussed above, that principle is an important component of arguments for
forum-shopping. Perhaps the public law forum-shopping decisions
should be seen as attempts to influence the content of substantive law.
Even so, it is noteworthy that the Court has utilized an anti-forum-shop-
ping approach as a means to achieve conservative outcomes. The ques-
tion to which we can now turn is whether this approach might carry over
to forum-shopping by private law plaintiffs.
C. Are Conservatives Pro-Defendant?
1. Private Law Plaintiffs and Conservatives-An Ideology
of Hostility?
An initial, general question is how conservatives view private law
plaintiffs. The meaning of "conservative" in the private law context is
discussed less and debated less than in the public law context. It is fre-
quently asserted that conservatives favor defendants.216 :Professor Wein-
berg, in reviewing recent developments in federal common law, describes
that law as moving in a conservative, anti-plaintiff direction: "Today's
federal common law tends to be a common law of begrudged remedies
and generous defenses.... A new, youthful defendant-oriented judiciary
is having its impact. ' 217 Let us assume that the conventional wisdom is
correct and examine some possible reasons underlying this pro-defendant
stance.
Conservatives may proceed from a belief that the substantive law
has developed to a point where it is tilted unfairly in favor of plaintiffs.
Writing in the conservative publication Benchmark, Gordon Crovitz has
advanced the view that "expanding liability for defendants is best under-
stood as a continuation by the courts of the New Deal political notion of
law as 'social justice.' ",21 This critique has several strands: a view of
215. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 140, at 236 (proposing that "litigants with fed-
eral constitutional claims should generally be able to choose the forum, federal or state, in
which to resolve their disputes").
216. E.g., Gottesman, supra note 3, at 14-15 (discussing the case for federal choice of law
statutes in the context of "the present climate of increasingly conservative courts").
217. Weinberg, supra note 51, at 850.
218. L. Gordon Crovitz, Torturing Torts: Common Law Activism in the States, 4 BENCH-
MARK 35, 36 (1988).
19931
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the law as redistributive (away from groups conservatives presumably
favor); concern that abandonment of notions of negligence and consent
de-emphasizes respect for individualist values; and disapproval of the
fact that these changes emanate from the courts. 2 19 These criticisms are
aimed, in particular, at pro-plaintiff developments in tort law.220
Apart from substantive issues, conservative views of private law dif-
fer from liberal views in that they strongly disfavor litigation. Liberals
tend to view litigation, including private lawsuits, as desirable and so-
cially beneficial. 221 Recent conservative writings manifest an intense dis-
like for private litigation. The emphasis on the deleterious impact of
lawsuits is seemingly separate and distinct from views about the substan-
tive law. Perhaps the best known of these efforts is the report of the
President's Council on Competitiveness, generally known as the "Quayle
Report. '222  The Report documents the extent of litigation in
America,223 describes what it perceives as abuses of the litigation pro-
cess,224 and argues that tort suits in particular are consuming resources
and impairing America's competitive position.22 Walter Olson's recent
book, The Litigation Explosion-What Happened When America Un-
leashed the Lawsuit, sounds many of the same themes and also contends
that extensive litigation wreaks social harm by turning beneficial rela-
tionships into adversarial ones.226 Peter Huber's book, Galileo's Revenge:
Junk Science in the Courtroom, takes aim at manipulative tactics by
plaintiffs' attorneys in the tort field.227 Legal conservatives tend to focus
extensively on the perceived caseload crisis in American courts, 228 view-
ing it as a serious problem in and of itself as well as a reflection and cause
219. Id at 35-37.
220. Crovitz relies heavily on the writings of Huber and Priest. See, eg., id. at 35-41
(citing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
(1988); George Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellec-
tual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 46 (1985)).
221. E.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View
of Summary Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 96
n.4 (1988).
222. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE RE-
FORM IN AMERICA (1991).
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 3-6.
225. Id. at 1-4.
226. OLSON, supra note 146, at 2.
227. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM pas-
sim (1992).
228. See, ag., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS--CRISIS AND REFORM 59-
168 (1985). Judge Posner argues that the federal judicial system is seriously overloaded and
focuses on the effects of this "crisis" at the appellate level. Id at 59-129. The existence of such
an overload is also an argument for taking cases out of the district courts. See George D.
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of other problems. Analysis of what might be called the ideologies of
litigation suggests a number of reasons for the conservative stance in ad-
dition to those stated explicitly.
Critics may view litigation as potentially redistributive. A large vol-
ume of suits-the caseload crisis-may indicate dissatisfaction with the
existing social order and represent an attempt to change it. In a
landmark article on Why The "Haves" Come Out Ahead,229 Professor
Marc Galanter argues that making litigation difficult benefits the
"haves." For example, an "overload increases the cost and risk of adju-
dicating and shields existing rules from challenge, diminishing opportu-
nities for rule-change. This tends to favor the beneficiaries of existing
rules."230 Conservatives might be seen as having an instinctive opposi-
tion to those who bring (and especially those who are seen as fomenting)
litigation.231
On the other hand, the "have-nots" and their champions (loosely
defined as liberals) may perceive litigation as an attractive vehicle for
changing rules.232 Thus, arguing from the have-not perspective, Profes-
sor Galanter advocates facilitating litigation through an increase in insti-
tutional resources "such that there is timely full-dress adjudication of
every claim put forward. ' 233  He predicts opposition from the benefi-
ciaries of the existing system.2 34 The parallels with substantive law sug-
gested by this analysis are striking. Conservatives look at the rights
asserter (the plaintiff) with suspicion, viewing him as a seeker of redistri-
bution, which they oppose, or an agent of social change, which threatens
their position. It is particularly galling that plaintiffs seek these advan-
tages from the courts as opposed to the more political branches in which
conservatives, presumably, enjoy greater advantages.235
I think, however, that the entire issue of conservative attitudes to-
ward private law litigation is considerably more complex than the above
analysis suggests. If, for example, conservatives are the beneficiaries of
Brown, Nonideological Judicial Reform and Its Limits-The Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 973, 988-89 (1990).
229. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, LAW & Soc'Y REv., Fall 1974, at 95.
230. Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
231. See Crovitz, supra note 218, at 42 (arguing that numerous reforms, including forcing
the losing party to pay all legal fees and court costs of the winning party, are necessary to
reduce the volume of litigation).
232. Galanter, supra note 229, at 137.
233. Id. at 139.
234. Id. at 140.
235. Cf id at 135-44 (discussing tendency of political process to favor entrenched interest
groups and suggesting strategies for reform).
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existing rules, why would they be hostile to those who invoke them? (A
partial answer may be that with some rules they have made an accommo-
dation that includes a low level of enforcement, and that increased en-
forcement, even of favorable rules is viewed as harmful.) Similarly, if
conservatives benefit from the caseload crisis,236 why are they so strongly
in favor of measures to reduce it? On a more general level, it seems
counterintuitive to view conservatives as opposed to courts. For exam-
ple, courts play an important role in protecting property rights and se-
curing the enforceability of commercial agreements. Indeed, a
libertarian conservative contends in a recent book that courts are one of
"three and only three" essential governmental functions2 37 and that
"proper civil courts are the most crucial need of a civilized society.
'238
Conservatives considering the matter thoroughly might acknowl-
edge that their opposition to private law litigation is focused on a limited
group of private suits as opposed to generalized opposition to public law
litigation.2 39 We can pursue the inquiry by utilizing Professor Galanter's
typology of litigants and lawsuits. He divides litigants into "one-shot-
ters" and "repeat players." 2' There is some correlation between "one-
shotters" and "have-nots" and between "repeat players" and "haves,"
although Galanter is careful to point out it is not an equation.241 Suits
then break down into four classes: one-shotters versus one-shotters; re-
peat players versus repeat players; repeat players versus one-shotters; and
one-shotters versus repeat players. It would seem that conservatives
would be neutral about the first two classes and might even look favora-
bly upon the third, which Professor Galanter finds the most numer-
ous.242 The only question mark is suits by one-shotters against repeat
players. Professor Galanter contends that the most frequent example is
personal injury suits243 and cites, among other examples, cases of welfare
client versus agency and tenant versus landlord.2'
Perhaps it is these types of suits that generally represent the charac-
teristics conservatives find threatening. The recent conservative writings
236. Under Professor Galanter's line of reasoning, conservatives benefit from the fact that
have-nots cannot pursue their claims. Professor Levit argues that conservatives use the crisis
to keep disfavored cases out of court. Levit, supra note 185, at 345.
237. LEONARD PEIKOFF, OBJECTIVISM: THE PHILOSOPHY OF AYN RAND 365 (1991).
238. Id.
239. Conservatives who want the courts to defend economic liberties presumably are not
hostile to public law litigation advancing such claims.
240. Galanter, supra note 229, at 97.
241. Id. at 103-04.
242. Id. at 108.
243. Id at 110.
244. Id at 107.
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discussed above do focus on tort suits and on the redistributive-reformist
nature of some private litigation. Perhaps they represent an effort to
identify "bad" lawsuits and deal with them as a class. I offer these obser-
vations primarily to show that probing the ideologies of litigation raises
doubts about an automatic pro-defendant stance on the part of conserva-
tives. Let us take as a working hypothesis, however, that conservatives
exhibit some tendencies of this position. We then can consider the extent
to which this view is found in the decisions of the current, conservative
Court, and how it might be expected to carry over, and does carry over,
to the Court's decisions on forum-shopping.
2. Private Law Plaintiffs in a Conservative Court
Has the Court shown in the private law context the same hostility
toward plaintiffs (rights asserters) that it has shown in the public law
context? Some commentators suggest that it has.245 In the public law
context, of course, the analysis is facilitated by the fact that the Court's
position on the substantive law invoked is often known. It is usually the
ultimate maker of that law. Thus, it is possible to identify relationships
between content and enforcement. This is much less the case in private
law matters, where the principal source of judge-made law is the state
courts. The lower federal courts also play a significant role, but much of
their contribution comes from diversity cases based on state law. The
Supreme Court's contributions to private law are less frequent and, in
many federal areas, are heavily affected by issues of statutory construc-
tion and doctrines of administrative law.246 One way to discern possible
Supreme Court attitudes toward private law plaintiffs is to examine "fed-
eral courts law" and related areas concerning access to federal courts and
the conduct of federal civil trials. Examination of several specific issues
in these broad categories lends support to the view that the Court shows
some tendency to disfavor civil plaintiffs.
A frequently cited illustration of this tendency is the Court's inter-
pretation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 governing summary
judgment.247 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,24s for example, the Court made
it easier for defendants to obtain summary judgement on an issue as to
245. See, eg., Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARv. L. REV. 4, 28-37 (1982) (small claims class actions); Levit, supra note 185, at 363.
246. A typical labor law case, for example, will present important issues along these lines
based on the National Labor Relations Board's direct participation as a party or its overall
policy in the area. Nonetheless, it is possible to examine labor law decisions as a means of
determining whether the court shows a pro-business attitude. See, eg., Galloway, supra note
196, at 75-76.
247. In a trilogy of cases decided in 1986, the Supreme Court addressed the standards for
summary judgment. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty
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which the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Despite seemingly contrary
language in the landmark case of Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,249 the
Court in Celotex ruled that the defendant can obtain summary judgment
on such an issue without introducing any evidence of its own. The de-
fendant, according to Justice Rehnquist, can discharge its burden by
"'showing'--that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case."1250 Celotex
and other recent summary judgment cases have been criticized as taking
"an already effective pro-defendant rule of civil procedure and mak[ing]
it strikingly more pro-defendant. '251 Critics have seen the summary
judgment cases as illustrative of a broader procedural "counterrevolu-
tion" benefitting civil defendants.2 2 According to these critics this de-
velopment is not an example of procedural neutrality; the pro-defendant
biases are intended.25 3
Another area in which the current Court has taken a markedly pro-
defendant stance is decisions on forum selection clauses (F.S.C.).25 4
Under an F.S.C. the parties to a transaction or relationship agree in ad-
vance to litigate all resultant disputes in a particular forum or set of fora.
Although the device gives both parties the planning advantage of know-
ing this information in advance of any litigation, the F.S.C. generally is
viewed as pro-defendant in operation.25 5 It helps the defendant blunt
plaintiff's law-seeking advantages and provides considerable convenience
to defendants facing multiple litigation. The Supreme Court has wel-
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574
(1986).
248. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
249. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes the Court took a pro-plaintiff position, imposing
substantial evidentiary burdens on defendants seeking to negate plaintiffs' factual case at the
summary judgment stage. Id. at 153-61.
250. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
251. Stempel, supra note 221, at 160.
252. E.g., D. Michael Risinger, Another Step in the Counter-Revolution: 4 Summary Judg-
ment on the Supreme Court's New Approach to Summary Judgment, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 39
(1988). Professor Risinger does not limit this observation to the Supreme Court, but also
includes the lower federal courts.
253. I d; Stempel, supra note 221, at 161.
254. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1991) (holding that forum
selection clause contained in form passage contract was reasonable and enforceable); Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp, 487 U.S. 22, 23 (1988) (holding that federal law governs district
court decision whether to give effect to forum-selection clause in diversity action); The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (holding that a forum selection clause is control-
ling unless enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust). For a discussion of forum selec-
tion clauses see LEFLAR et al., supra note 153, § 49, at 156-59.
255. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 14-15. For a hypothetical illustration of a potential de-
fendant's use of a forum selection clause, see Freer, supra note 42, at 1092-94.
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corned F.S.C.s with open arms. According to Justice Kennedy, such
clauses are of great benefit to the parties and conserve important judicial
resources. 25 6  The recent decision in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute25 7 offers a striking example of the Court's attitude toward F.S.C.s.
The defendant cruise line's tickets contained a standard clause requiring
all litigation against it to be brought in a court located in Florida. The
plaintiff bought a ticket in the state of Washington and suffered injury in
international waters during a cruise that departed from Los Angeles.258
The Court ordered enforcement of the clause despite contentions of dis-
parate bargaining power and severe inconvenience to the plaintiffs.259
Justice Stevens in dissent chided the majority for abandoning the strong
admiralty and common-law tradition of protecting plaintiffs' litigation
opportunities in the face of claims that they have been bargained away.2"°
Carnival certainly goes beyond the current Court's initial endorsement of
F.S.C.s in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore C0.2 1-a case in which the
Court emphasized that the parties were of equal bargaining power and
each might expect to be sued.2 62
The Burger-Rehnquist Court's approach to a wide range of standard
"federal courts" issues also shows a pro-defendant tilt. Consider the re-
lated areas of federal common law and implied rights of action. The
Court has adhered to the position that federal common law can be fash-
ioned in only a limited number of areas. In Miree v. DeKalb County2 63 it
refused to allow the creation of such law in an action between a private
plaintiff and a local government entity.2" In City of Milwaukee v. Eli-
nois265 the Court announced a restrictive approach to federal environ-
mental common law.266 It has taken a similar approach in implied right
of action cases in which the plaintiff seeks private judicial enforcement of
a statute which imposes federal duties but does not provide for this
256. Ricoh, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that F.S.C.s save litigants
costs and "relieve courts of time consuming pretrial motions").
257. 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
258. Id. at 1524.
259. Id. at 1526-28.
260. Id at 1529-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also John M. Kirby, Note, Consumer's
Right to Sue at Home Jeopardized Through Forum Selection Clause in Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 70 N.C. L. REv. 888, 915 (1992) (arguing that Court failed to analyze clause for adhe-
sion and due process violation).
261. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
262. Id at 12-14.
263. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
264. Id at 31-33.
265. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
266. Id. at 332 (noting that Congress supplanted federal common law with the establish-
ment of an expert administrative agency).
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method of enforcement. Although the cases on this subject are not uni-
form, the current Court has curtailed sharply the availability of implied
rights.
267
The cases in both areas reflect a concern for separation of powers.26
8
Federal common law also poses problems of federalism.269 In operation,
at least, these cases also work to the benefit of defendants. Plaintiffs are
unhappy with whatever other remedies are available, either under state
law or through federal administrative processes, and they seek federal
judicial relief against the defendant. The Court's denial preserves the
existing balance. Concern for defendants may be express. For example,
in condemning implied rights of action Justice Powell argued that they
upset a balance struck by Congress and impose costs upon defendants
which only Congress should impose.2 71 When a plaintiff seeks the crea-
tion of federal common law, the Court tends to deny the request. In
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. ,271 however, it departed from general
practice and authorized creation of federal common law in favor of a
private defendant-a defense contractor.272 The Court reasoned that the
defendant's interests were closely related to those of the United States.273
One need not stop here. Hostility toward private civil plaintiffs can
be found across the range of federal jurisdiction. The Court has con-
strued the "arising under" requirement of § 1331274 narrowly, treating as
nonfederal a plaintiff's claim under state law that purportedly incorpo-
rated federal standards.27 Diversity jurisdiction has also been treated
narrowly. 276 The Court's strict approach to pendent party jurisdic-
267. For an example of a recent decision showing the restrictive approach to implied rights
of action, see Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 (1988).
268. See generally George D. Brown, Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's
Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REV. 617, 627-40
(1984) (discussing relationship of implied right and federal common law cases).
269. See Field, supra note 48, at 890 n.29 ("States' sphere of influence is lessened when
federal common law plays a broad role.").
270. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730-31 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
271. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
272. Id. at 511-13.
273. Id at 505-07.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (granting district courts "original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
275. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986).
276. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (holding that each plaintiff
in a diversity class action must separately satisfy the minimum amount in controversy require-
ment specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)); Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 336 (1969) (emphasiz-
ing that enactment of FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23 did not change scope of
jurisdiction of federal district courts).
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tion277-- since rejected by Congress-frustrated both public law27 and
private law plaintiffs.2 79 Commentators have seen in the Court's ap-
proach to class actions evidence of hostility toward these suits, which are
essentially a plaintiff's device.280
The pattern is not monolithic. The Court's receptivity toward Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure281 may reflect a perception
that the rule favors defendants2 2 although awards of sanctions in favor
of a plaintiff are possible.28 3 Similarly, in the complex area of applying
the doctrine of res judicata to suits under federal antitrust law and paral-
lel state laws the decisions point in both directions.284 Still, a significant
portion of the Court's output in the areas discussed is anti-plaintiff. Ana-
lysts may well differ on whether these decisions reflect neutral applica-
tion of generally neutral principles, a desire to harm identifiable groups
of plaintiffs, or a general desire to restrict the ambit of federal courts.
Even if the last concern is the key element, it is impossible to say how
much it represents a worry about caseloads, a desire to conserve federal
judicial resources for presumably more deserving cases, a desire to keep
state courts in the forefront of private law litigation, or a general unar-
ticulated antipathy toward all plaintiffs.
The search for judicial motives has its limits, but the pattern of re-
suits is clear. Let us in any event take as proved the following general
277. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 553 (1989) (holding that the FTCA does not
provide federal district court with jurisdiction over defendants other than the United States).
278. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) (holding that the joinder of a municipal
corporation "for purposes of asserting a state-law claim not within federal diversity jurisdic-
tion is without the statutory jurisdiction of the district court").
279. Finley, 490 U.S. at 545.
280. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 245, at 26-45 (discussing hostility, with some exceptions,
of Burger Court).
281. Rule 11 allows courts to sanction the attorney who signs a document submitted to a
court if the document alleges facts that a "reasonable inquiry" would have disproved, is not
"warranted by existing law" or a good-faith argument for change in law, or is ified for an
"improper purpose." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
282. Stephen Labaton, Solution to Wasteful Lawsuits Becomes a Problem, N.Y. TIMES,
June 14, 1992, § 4, at 2 (discussing growing volume of Rule 11 litigation).
283. In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123 (1991), the Court affrmed an award of
sanctions against a defendant. The opinion upheld the application of sanctions in a diversity
case under the trial court's inherent judicial power, even though some of the sanctions could
have been imposed under Rule 11, and state law would not have permitted the sanction. Id at
2136.
284. Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 386 (1985)
(holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 requires district courts first to look to state law to determine
the preclusive effect of a state judgement); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S.
394, 395 (1981) (holding that res judicata bars relitigation of an unappealed adverse judgment
even when other plaintiffs in similar actions against common defendants have successfully ap-
pealed the judgments against them).
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propositions: The Court is conservative; this conservatism has included
a significant degree of hostility toward public law plaintiffs; and to a con-
siderable extent, this attitude has manifested itself in the case of private
law plaintiffs as well. Applying these propositions to the specific issue of
forum-shopping by private law plaintiffs, we would expect the Court to
be hostile as well.
D. The Court's Anti-Forum-Shopping Stance
In the federal-state context the Court has indeed manifested a hos-
tile attitude, emphasizing Erie's proscription of federal-state forum-shop-
ping. A recent example is the refusal in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.285
to apply a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in the face of a conflicting
state provision. The plaintiff fied his complaint within the period pro-
vided by the state statute of limitations.286 He argued that he therefore
had complied with the statute of limitations because Federal Rule 3 pro-
vides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court. 287 The defendant, however, invoked the rest of the state provi-
sion, which required the issuance of summons within the limitations pe-
riod and service within sixty days of issuance. The Court agreed with the
defendant, reasoning in part that the state requirements were closely
bound up with the substantive state law of the statute of limitations.288
Since the plaintiff had not complied with the latter part of the state provi-
sion, his case could not remain in federal court.28 9
The most significant aspects of the Walker decision are the Court's
somewhat strained reading of Rule 3 and its unwillingness to follow the
nationalistic sweep of Hanna v. Plumer.290 The Court insisted that Rule
3 simply does not address the running of statutes of limitations, despite
the fact that knowing whether the time period has been met is one of the
most important reasons why one needs to know when an action has been
commenced.291 In the Court's view, "in diversity actions Rule 3 governs
the date from which various timing requirements of the Federal Rules
begin to run. '2 92 Hanna pointed toward a broad application of the
Rules, emphasizing that they derive their legitimacy from Congress'
285. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
286. Id at 742.
287. Id. at 743 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 3).
288. Id. at 751.
289. Id at 751-53.
290. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
291. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750-51.
292. Id. at 751 (footnote omitted).
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powers over the federal courts.293 In particular Hanna seemed to cast
doubt on Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,294 an earlier
Erie case in which the Court resolved a problem analogous to that of
Walker in favor of state law.295
As the analysis in Part II suggests, these cases can be viewed as the
application of Erie to questions of state and federal regulatory power
over various aspects of diversity cases.29 6 Thus it is not surprising that
Hanna, a product of the Warren Court, took a nationalist approach.
Walker is a return to the post-Erie emphasis on state powers. Obviously,
there are implications for forum-shopping that flow from these regula-
tory concerns. Any attempt to make the federal court function like the
state court "a block away' 297 serves federalism goals of allocating regula-
tory power and also deters shopping for the federal court by those plain-
tiffs who would benefit from the particular practice in question. Apart
from the result in Walker, the Court's language in a number of cases
continues to emphasize the anti-forum-shopping goals of Erie.29
Although not discussed explicitly, there is also an anti-forum-shopping
dimension to many of the "federal courts" cases discussed above. Plain-
tiffs who seek the creation of federal common law are shopping for a
substantive advantage over the law offered in a state forum. The same is
true of some implied rights plaintiffs and also may be true of plaintiffs
who seek potential federalization of their case through a broad reading of
"arising under." 29 9 A close relationship exists between applicable law
and choice of forum.
As noted, a more direct, albeit implicit, aversion to the practice can
293. 380 U.S. at 473-74.
294. 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949) ("We cannot give [a cause of action] longer life in the
federal court system than it would have had in the state court without adding something to the
cause of action.").
295. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476-77 (Harlan, ., concurring) (suggesting that Ragan be
overruled). The lower court in Walker felt obliged to follow Ragan, but recognized the appar-
ent conflict between it and Hanna. Walker v. Armeo Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 1133, 1136 (10th
Cir. 1979), affid, 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
296. See generally Stein, supra note 72 (addressing the tension in diversity cases between
federal and state regulation of court access, including the issues of personal jurisdiction, capac-
ity, venue, forum non conveniens, transfer, and statutes of limitations).
297. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (explaining Erie's central thesis
"that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court
instead of a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially different result").
298. See Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 (1991); Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27 n.6
(1988). The Court's practice, as shown in these cases, is to refer to Erie's "twin aims": avoid-
ance of forum-shopping and inequitable administration of the laws.
299. Such plaintiffs may feel that they have a better chance for a broad interpretation of
possible federal claims in a federal court.
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be found in the public law forum-shopping cases. In the private law con-
text a similar attitude can be found in the forum selection clause deci-
sions. An F.S.C. represents primarily anticipatory forum-shopping by a
potential defendant as well as an effort to thwart any such tactics by the
potential plaintitf.3 The Court's attitude toward forum non conveniens
also proves instructive. Although § 1404(a)301 essentially has eliminated
use of that doctrine by the federal courts in domestic cases, 30 2 it can still
arise in international litigation. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno 30° the
Court invoked the doctrine to frustrate an attempt at international fo-
rum-shopping. The Court paid mere lip service to the notion of respect-
ing the plaintiff's choice of forum and treated as relatively unimportant
the plaintiff's desire to seek favorable law.31 Piper represents an en-
dorsement of forum non conveniens. As demonstrated by the several
opinions in the Texas Supreme Court's recent landmark decision in Dow
Chemical Corp. v. Castro Alfaro,3 °5 favorable attitudes towards forum
non conveniens correlate closely with unfavorable attitudes toward fo-
rum-shopping by plaintiffs.3°6
Certainly one would expect conservatives to take a dim view of fo-
rum-shopping. It can be seen as the quintessential pro-plaintiff device,
representing manipulation of the system to achieve windfall recoveries
and deprive defendants of advantages on a level playing field. The de-
fendants involved are generally interstate corporate entities, classic "re-
peat players." Conservatives are also likely to be attracted by the
formalistic notions of law that forum-shopping threatens. Certainly they
are not attracted by such pro-forum-shopping premises as the desirability
of litigation or the notion that plaintiffs inherently represent the better
view of the law. Therefore one would expect the Burger-Rehnquist
Court to manifest across-the-board opposition to forum-shopping and to
attempt to crush the practice in whatever shape. When it comes to state-
state forum-shopping by private law plaintiffs, however, the picture be-
comes considerably more complex.
300. Freer, supra note 42, at 1092-93.
301. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
302. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 91 (1985).
303. 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
304. Id. at 249 n.15. It should be noted that the real parties in interest in Piper were
foreign nationals, and that this element of the case undercut respect for the choice of forum.
305. 787 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 671 (1991).
306. Compare id. at 689 (Doggett, J., concurring) ("The parochial perspective embodied in
the doctrine of forum non conveniens enables corporations to evade legal control merely be-
cause they are transnational.") with id. at 697 (Cook, J., dissenting) (likening forum-shopping
plaintiffs to "turn-of-the-century wildcatters" and maintaining the necessity of forum non con-
veniens to counter the risk of exposing Texans to suits "of any plaintiff, no matter how distant
from Texas is that plaintiff's home or cause of action").
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V. STATE-STATE FORUM-SHOPPING AND THE BURGEiR-RHENQUIST
COURT: How STATES RIGHTS TRIUMPHED OVER ANTI-
FORUM-SHOPPING CONCERNS
A. The Court's Pivotal Role-The Cases
Choice of law practices in the state courts are the main impetus be-
hind the current wave of forum-shopping. As with other forms of state
governmental action, however, the federal Constitution has the potential
to impose significant limits. Throughout the twentieth century the Court
has held that the Due Process Clause307 and the Full Faith and Credit
Clause30 8 restrain a state's ability to apply its own law to a case before its
courts.3 9 As the states aggressively applied their laws to a widening
range of situations, the Supreme Court's willingness to intervene and de-
vise meaningful limits based on these clauses became a pivotal factor in
the growth of forum-shopping.
At one point, the Court applied the Constitution strictly-not only
as a limit on a state's application of its own law, but also as a directive
about which law it should apply.310 Subsequent cases abandoned this
approach. The Court struck down application of forum law when the
forum state had little or no relationship to the matter at issue,3 " but took
the fundamental step of recognizing that "a set of facts giving rise to a
lawsuit... may justify, in constitutional terms, application of the law of
more than one jurisdiction. '' 312 This recognition helped lay the founda-
tions for the choice of law revolution.31 3 Prior to the 1980s, however, the
Court had not considered at any length the relationship between that
revolution as it developed in the state courts and constitutional doctrine
on choice of law. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague314 provided an oppor-
tunity for that consideration.
Allstate arose out of a vehicle accident in Wisconsin involving Wis-
307. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
308. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
309. The Court's general approach is not to distinguish between the scope of these two
clauses in choice of law cases. See, eg., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10
(1981). But see id. at 322 (Stevens, J., concurring) (advocating different inquiry for each
clause).
310. E.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 157-59, 163 (1932) (directing
a New Hampshire court to afford full faith and credit to a defense available under the Vermont
Compensation Act where parties had incorporated Vermont law into their employment
contract).
311. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930).
312. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307.
313. See supra text accompanying notes 150-70 (discussing changes in choice of law
theories).
314. 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
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consin residents. The widow of a deceased victim had remarried and
moved to Minnesota. She sued the deceased's insurance company in a
Minnesota state court under an uninsured motorist clause of his pol-
icy.315 His policy covered three automobiles. Minnesota law would al-
low her to "stack"-to recover up to three times the limit for each
automobile. Wisconsin law did not allow stacking.316 The Minnesota
courts applied Minnesota law.317 The Supreme Court ruled, in a plural-
ity opinion,318 that the choice of law decision was constitutionally per-
missible. The Court stressed that its role was not to second guess the
choice of law reasoning of the state courts, but only to examine whether
that reasoning stayed within constitutional boundaries.319 It described
those boundaries in the following terms: to apply its law a state must
have a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating
state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction." 320 It
found significant contacts in the decedent's commute to work in Minne-
sota, his widow's Minnesota residency, and the defendant insurance com-
pany's business transacted in Minnesota.321 The dissent accepted the
general framework, but would have found the contacts present in Allstate
insufficient to satisfy it.
3 22
If the plot of Allstate was "The Choice of Law Revolution Meets the
Constitution," the clear winner was the Revolution. All the Justices
agreed on applying only what the dissenters called a "modest check on
state power. ' 323 The plurality's statement of the test, utilizing the re-
quirement of "significant," appears to have some teeth, but its applica-
tion indicated that the test was easily met. Minnesota's contacts were
more tangential than significant. Of equal importance is the plurality's
apparent embrace of the changes in state choice of law practices. The
opinion seems to tie the requirement of contacts creating "interests" di-
rectly to the rise of interest analysis in choice of law. 324 There is a clear
implication that older constitutional decisions are irrelevant because they
315. Id at 305.
316. Id. at 306.
317. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978), aft'd, 449 U.S. 302
(1981).
318. Eight Justices participated in the decision. Justice Brennan wrote for a plurality of
four, including Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Stevens concurred, and Jus-
tice Powell dissented with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist.
319. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307.
320. Id at 308.
321. Id. at 313-19.
322. Id at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
323. Id
324. See id at 324-25 n.11 (discussing the dominant role of interest analysis in modem
choice of law theory).
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relied on a territorial view of choice of law discredited by modem
theories.325
Moreover, the opinion cites with apparent approval a number of ex-
pansive state choice of law decisions.326 Allstate represents only the opin-
ion of four Justices; however, Justice Stevens, who concurred, would
have gone even further in upholding forum application of forum law in
all cases. He advocated attaching "a presumption of validity to a forum
State's decision to apply its own law to a dispute over which it has juris-
diction. '327 On balance, Allstate merits Brilmayer and Lee's description
as "the most expansive choice of law decision in Supreme Court his-
tory. ' 328 Modem choice of law approaches give states extraordinary lati-
tude in finding interests. In theory, a court might apply its own highly
pro-plaintiff law to an out-of-state transaction involving out-of-state de-
fendants to signal in-state defendants that it takes that law very seriously
and thus deter their future conduct. If the Supreme Court is willing to
equate claimed interests with contacts, then anything goes.
Allstate, however, is not the Court's last word. In Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts32 9 the Court applied the Allstate test to strike down an ap-
plication of forum law. The question is how much significance to attach
to Shutts. The case was a class action brought by gas leaseholders
against the lessee producer arising out of a royalty dispute. The lease-
holders lived in all fifty states; the leases covered land in several states,
primarily Texas and Oklahoma. The Supreme Court reversed the Kan-
sas Supreme Court's decision that Kansas law applied to all class mem-
bers. The Court held that Kansas lacked any interest in claims involving
non-Kansas leases.330 Kansas's interest in regulating the defendant's in-
state activities331 did not extend to these other leases. Moreover, the par-
ties executing non-Kansas leases would not have expected Kansas law to
apply.
332
Does Shutts demonstrate that Allstate really does impose meaningful
limits on state choice of law practices? At first blush, the answer seems
to be yes. The Court explicitly recognized the relationship between
choice of law and forum-shopping and indicated a cleax desire not to
325. Id.
326. Id. at 314-15 n.19, 316-17 n.22.
327. Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
328. Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 94, at 849.
329. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
330. Id. at 822.
331. Id. at 819.
332. Id. at 822.
1993]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
encourage the practice.333 There were arguments for application of Kan-
sas law. That state was concerned with the defendant's conduct toward
its residents, and that conduct was involved in the case before its courts.
Moreover, in a nationwide class action there are practical advantages to
be derived from applying one law to the claims of the entire class.334 The
key is how one applies the logic of class actions to Shutts., If the plaintiffs
are viewed as a single entity, subjected to a single act on the defendant's
part, it could be contended that the law of any of the states across which
that act was spread could apply. The Court, however, analyzed the class
claim as an aggregation of individual claims and weighed the constitu-
tionality of "application of Kansas law to every claim in this case."
3 35
Texas leaseholders unhappy with payments on a Texas lease could not
get Kansas law applied to their grievance by suing in Kansas courts. The
Court treated their membership in a class represented by Kansas plain-
tiffs as not affecting their out-of-state status. This approach treats the
class action defendant as if it had been sued by individuals, or groups of
individuals, rather than by one monolithic entity.336
From a choice of law perspective, Shutts serves mainly to establish
the outer bounds of Allstate: A forum may not apply its substantive law
solely by virtue of being the forum to a matter otherwise unconnected
with it. The fact that the defendant carries on similar activities within
the state does not give the state a regulatory interest over unconnected
out-of-state activities. The latter point has the potential to develop into a
significant limitation. It might place roadblocks in the way of state
courts that wish to impose liability under their own law upon their own
corporations for actions committed out of state.337 Perhaps, however,
being a corporation's home state confers a greater regulatory interest
than Kansas had in Phillips.
The possibility that the Court views Shutts as a serious limit on state
choice of law practices, remote in the case itself, is even more remote
after Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman.33s The fact pattern was similar to Shutts.
The question before the Court was whether Kansas could apply its stat-
ute of limitations to claims involving non-Kansas leases to which it could
333. Id at 820.
334. Id at 820-23.
335. Id at 822 (emphasis added).
336. See Chayes, supra, note 245, at 28 (discussing whether class action should be treated
as aggregation of individual claims or suit by "a single jural entity").
337. See Tomlin v. Boeing Co., 650 F.2d 1065, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying pro-
plaintiff Washington law to an out-of-state tort committed by a resident defendant).
338. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988); Weinberg, supra note 4, at 68-69 (as-
serting that "[a]fter Wortman any choice of law will be constitutional, apparently, as long as it
is effected by some traditional, 'subsisting' choice of law rule").
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not apply its substantive law. The Court upheld application of the Kan-
sas statute. Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority339 was relatively
brief on this point. It emphasized the historical practice of treating stat-
utes of limitation as procedural and reaffirmed the general understanding
that the forum state is constitutionally free to apply its procedural rules
to cases before it. Widespread historical practice played the key role in
his due process analysis.34 The overall tone of his opinion is one of
"hands off" where state conflict of laws decisions are concerned. He reit-
erated the general proposition found in Allstate that in many instances
the law of more than one state can constitutionally apply.34' In response
to the argument that statutes of limitations might be regarded as substan-
tive under modern choice of law theories, he refused to permit the Court
to "embark upon the enterprise of constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules,
with no compass to guide us beyond our own perceptions of what seems
desirable."342
Justice Brennan, concurring, seemed willing to engage in some in-
quiry along these lines,343 but after broaching the subject backed off
quickly and concluded that the forum state had sufficient "procedural
interests" to satisfy the Allstate test. 3" Justice Brennan did manifest a
desire to see the Court play some role in reviewing state choice of law
decisions and indicated that the Court's "current test" provides a stan-
dard.345 His disagreement with the majority concerned the possibility of
a more searching inquiry in future choice of law cases. He saw the
Court's deferential approach as extending to "purely substantive is-
sues." '346 His particular concern was with the apparent validation of any
practice that is widespread and traditional. Of course, the new conflicts
law has introduced new modes of analysis that can be used to justify use
of forum substantive law. This widespread practice might be invoked by
the Court in the future as partial evidence that such modes satisfy due
339. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the court, in Part I of which all participating
members joined, in Part II in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, and
O'Connor joined, and in Part III in which Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens joined. Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice O'Connor filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part on the ground that the Kansas Supreme Court had
not adequately considered what the law of the other states was, in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist joined. Justice Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
340. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 723-29.
341. Id. at 727.
342. Id. at 727-28.
343. See id. at 735-36 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
344. Id. at 736-37 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
345. Id. at 740-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
346. Id. at 740 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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process concerns. The Sun Oil majority seemed bent on circumscribing
the Court's role in choice of law review. In addressing the case before it
the majority reached out, in dictum, to list other arguably procedural
matters on which the forum state can apply it own laws.347 The whole
tone of the opinion is that the states set the standard for acceptable prac-
tices and that any alteration of those practices should come from the
states themselves or, perhaps, from Congress. 48
Sun Oil does not point entirely in one direction. Two members of
the Court indicated the question would be harder if the states in which
the claims arose considered statutes of limitation to be part of their sub-
stantive law. 349 As noted, the three concurring Justices envisaged a
broader Supreme Court role in choice of law cases. In analyzing the
case's significance these nuances must be discussed, as well as the result
and the apparent thrust of the majority opinion. But nuances are not
enough. Much stronger Supreme Court action is necessary to brake the
forum-shopping momentum in state courts. The natural inclination of
those courts to apply their own law has been encouraged, perhaps inten-
sified, by academic theories. In this context, anything less than a tough
federal standard and a willingness to enforce it will leave the wave of
forum-shopping largely unabated.
The analysis in this subsection has, thus far, examined the Burger-
Rehnquist Court's choice of law cases. The next logical step might seem
to be an in-depth review of the Court's cases on personal jurisdiction.
After all, forum-shopping cannot occur unless the defendant can be sued
in the forum, and the post-International Shoe 31 developments in consti-
tutional standards are often cited as a factor in the growth of forum-
shopping.5 My inclination, however, is to take the current status of
personal jurisdiction as a given. The focus of this Article is on shopping
for law. It may well be that once the forum has obtained jurisdiction the
choice of law battle is often over, given the proclivity of courts to decide
to apply their own law. That state of affairs exists, however, largely be-
cause there is no meaningful check on those decisions. If choice of law
practices are viewed as a problem, the way to address that problem is
through supervision of these practices. As Professor Shreve states, "Ju-
347. d at 728.
348. Id. at 728-29.
349. Id at 743 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's opinion.
350. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe is the
major Supreme Court decision in the development of states' authority to sue defendants re-
gardless of their presence at the time of suit.
351. See, eg., Gottesman, supra note 3, at 2.
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risdictional doctrine is a poor surrogate for choice-of-law review. ' '352
In this respect, I tend to side with the view that personal jurisdiction
and choice of law are conceptually distinct.353 Two other) points lead to
downplaying the significance of recent personal jurisdiction cases. All-
state presented the Court with the opportunity to make new constitu-
tional doctrine in response to new state court practices. Personal
jurisdiction, on the other hand, represents an area of extensive ongoing
dialogue between the Supreme Court and the states governed by such
earlier landmark decisions as International Shoe and Hess v. Pawloski.
354
Given the strong pro-jurisdiction thrust of these decisions, the current
Court would have had to mount an extensive counter-revolution to re-
duce forum-shopping this way. A second point is that to some extent the
Court has tried. As one authority notes, "After Hague it seems clear
that the Due Process Clause allows states extraordinary latitude in devel-
oping choice-of-law rules. The due process restrictions on state jurisdic-
tion are considerably greater than those on choice of law.' 355 The Court
has taken a restrictive approach to such pro-plaintiff staples as the
stream-of-commerce theory35 6 and the concept of general jurisdiction.357
Overall the cases are mixed with plaintiffs and defendants each winning
victories.358  Given the realities of a highly interdependent interstate
economy, the Court is unlikely to cut down much further on the ability
of plaintiffs to sue in more than one state. In my view that serves to
underscore the importance of choice of law cases as the main vehicle for
dealing with state-state forum-shopping for favorable law.
There is, however, another group of cases in which the Supreme
Court has played an important role in "shoring up" the present sys-
352. Shreve, supra note 158, at 355.
353. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 317 n.23 (discussing the relationship between the two
concepts).
354. 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (concluding that a nonresident motorist may be subject to
the forum state's jurisdiction in suits arising from auto accidents in the fbrum state).
355. COUND et al., supra note 41, at 107.
356. Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987). Writing for a plural-
ity of the court, Justice O'Connor stated:
[ihe "substantive connection"... between the defendant and the forum State neces-
sary for a finding of minimum contacts must come about by an action of the defend-
ant purposefully directed towards the forum state .... The placement of a product
into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purpose-
fully directed toward the forum state.
Id. (Citations omitted).
357. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,418 (1984) (denying
general jurisdiction over corporation that had occasional contacts with state).
358. Compare Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 487 (1985) (plaintiff victory)
with World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980) (defendant
victory).
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tern.359 These cases concern the role of the federal courts in state law
cases where forum-shopping is a potential factor. In this area the Court
has striven to apply Erie, but not to prevent state-state forum-shopping.
The Court has emphasized Erie's condemnation of federal-state forum-
shopping in cases presenting questions of state-state forum-shopping by
plaintiffs in the federal courts. The Court has relied on Erie's ideal of
uniformity to preserve whatever opportunities for state-state forum-shop-
ping would already have existed in the state system. It may, indeed, have
acted to enhance them. On a more fundamental level, it has continued
the post-Erie practice of refusing to allow defendants to utilize the fed-
eral court system as a vehicle for negating plaintiffs' state law shopping
advantages.
Let us reconsider the situation facing the Court in Ferens. If plain-
tiffs had brought the tort claim in a Pennsylvania federal court that court
would have acted like a Pennsylvania state court and dismissed it. If
they had brought suit in a Mississippi federal court and remained there
that court would, under Klaxon v. Stentor,360 have applied Mississippi
choice of law principles and retained the case under the Mississippi stat-
ute of limitations. The plaintiffs, however, did neither of these things.
They started in Mississippi but ended up in Pennsylvania federal court
with a Pennsylvania case that the courts of that state would not have
heard. Justice Scalia in dissent argued that this violated the principle of
uniformity within Pennsylvania. 61 Justice Kennedy, writing for the ma-
jority, insisted that it was only a by-product of Erie. The Ferens could go
to Mississippi and forum-shop there. The federal court in Mississippi
"had to replicate' 362 this opportunity. He saw the case as illustrating the
Erie-based neutrality of the diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs get to keep
what the states have already given them.
Let us for a moment accept the neutrality principle. It should not
follow from this principle that plaintiffs can go to federal court and get
more forum-shopping advantages than they would have gotten in state
court. Is that not what the Ferens did? The Mississippi state courts
could not have given them a transfer to Pennsylvania with the Missis-
sippi statute of limitations. Thus the principle of neutrality was arguably
violated. 63 The Ferens majority relied heavily on Van Dusen v. Bar-
359. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 68-69 (viewing forum-shopping as "suggest[ing] an implicit
national policy in favor of safe and fair interstate commerce").
360. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
361. Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
362. Id at 527.
363. Maltz, supra note 13, at 257-58. It is true that the result does not give them any
different law than they could already have gotten in Mississippi. However, the transfer makes
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rack 364 for the proposition that § 1404(a) embodies a policy of not letting
transfer "deprive parties of state-law advantages. 3 65 The holding of Van
Dusen, and a cornerstone of modern federal practice, is that in a
§ 1404(a) transfer of a diversity case the transferee court applies the law
of the transferor court's state.366 The Court's reasoning has been that a
contrary result would not only deprive plaintiffs of state law advantages,
but would also permit § 1404 to become an instrument for defendant
forum-shopping.367 Suppose, however, that the courts of the transferor
state would have dismissed the plaintiff's case on grounds of forum non
conveniens. The defendant is stuck with the law of a state which the
plaintiff could not have.gotten in that state. In other words, the policy of
neutrality-replication, which the current Court upholds consistently,
may also give plaintiffs more forum-shopping opportunities than they
would get in the states.368 It is hard to believe that Erie requires that.
For that matter, what is wrong with forum-shopping by defendants?
It is not clear that any reliance factor on the part of the plaintiffs is sub-
stantially weakened as long as the law of a significantly related state is
applied. If the advocates of forum-shopping wish to downplay reliance
on the part of defendants, the argument cuts both ways. Erie does seem
to point toward uniformity within states in terms of diversity plaintiffs
not getting substantive law advantages from the federal court, but does
that carry over to defendants? Might not defendants have a claim to use
the diversity jurisdiction to negate the advantages plaintiffs receive from
the state court, at least when those advantages are perceived as unfair?
The classic area in which these questions are posed is the question of
federal choice of law rules in diversity cases and the continuing vitality of
Klaxon v. Stentor.369 Klaxon forbids any such development. Recent
cases have shown that the Court continues to view Klaxon as a pivotal
decision.370 Indeed, the Court summarily reaffirmed the validity of
Klaxon in 1975.371 I raise these matters at this point primarily to illus-
trate how Erie, the quintessential anti-forum-shopping case, has been ap-
it much more likely that they will in fact take advantage of their initial ability to shop in
Mississippi. Mississippi could not have given them this combination of law plus ability to use
it in Pennsylvania.
364. 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
365. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 523.
366. FRIEDINTHAL, supra note 302, at 215-16.
367. Ferens, 494 U.S. at 523.
368. This point was reserved in Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 639-40.
369. 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
370. E.g., Ferens, 494 U.S. at 527-28; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh, 487 U.S. 22, 37 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
371. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975).
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plied to guarantee to plaintiffs that opportunities for state-state forum-
shopping are available equally, if not more so, to them in federal as well
as state court. As for those opportunities themselves, the Court's consti-
tutional choice of law cases ensure that they will grow and prosper.
B. Might the Cases Have Come Out Differently?
One might have expected something different from a conservative
Supreme Court. It has repeatedly emphasized the anti-forum-shopping
dimension of Erie, without drawing any explicit distinction between fed-
eral-state and state-state aspects. In the public law area it has developed
numerous doctrines that are strongly anti-forum-shopping in operation.
In private law litigation the Court has often shown a general hostility to
plaintiffs and has given hints that it disapproves of forum-shopping. It is
true that one can find language on personal jurisdiction that appears to
look favorably upon the practice, 372 but the overall thrust of the relevant
cases outside the state-state area points in the direction of accepting and
furthering an anti-forum-shopping principle. The question that arises is
whether that principle could have carried over to the choice of law
cases-the decisions that have played such a direct and pivotal role in
fostering the practice of shopping between state laws.
Allstate is obviously the key. The Court could have started with the
premise that any case potentially involving forum-shopping requires
some scrutiny, at least if the court below appears to have strained to
apply forum law by manipulating choice of law doctrine. The Court
might have formulated a different test. For example, it could have fo-
cused on whether Minnesota's regulatory sphere over the activities of
insurance companies extended to the situation presented in the case.
Professor Shreve has suggested an. approach that focuses on whether the
forum state "has a policy which it has some demonstrable interest in
advancing. '3 73 Other formulations are, of course, possible.
However, the actual Allstate test could have reined in state choice of
law practices, at least if the Court had applied the qualifier "significant"
to the contacts it found. The most questionable aspect of the Allstate
decision is the application of the test, allowing what the dissent charac-
terized as "trivial" contacts374 to justify application of Minnesota law.
That state's concern for its out-of-state workers may not stretch to the
372. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1989) ("The victim of a libel,
like the victim of any other tort, may choose to bring suit in any forum with which the defend-
ant has 'certain minimum contacts. ... .' ") (citations omitted).
373. Shreve, supra note 158, at 351.
374. 449 U.S. at 332 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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insurance dimensions of out-of-state automobile accident. 375 Of course
it is possible that the insurance company was not surprised by the appli-
cation of Minnesota law because it did business there and could expect
Minnesota law to apply to some policy disputes.376 This analysis might
be extrapolated to stand for the proposition that an interstate business
can never complain about the application to it of the law of any state in
which it does business, whether or not the particular suit is related to in-
state business. That is not much of a limit. If the case comes down to
Minnesota's desire to give the benefit of its law to its plaintiff, the Court
might well have said that is not enough of an interest to justify exercising
that form of sovereignty. That interest was particularly weak given that
the plaintiff had moved to Minnesota after most of the relevant events
had occurred.37 7
Striking down Minnesota's application of its law would have fo-
cused on the weakness of its claim to exercise sovereignty rather than on
any effort to identify and weigh Wisconsin's competing interests. Per-
haps the Court would have had to discern from the facts at least a prima
facie case for the application of some law other than that of the forum.378
The facts suggest this solution,379 and suggest as well the classic combi-
nation of forum-shopping and judicial manipulation .38  Had the Court
wanted to carve out a strong role in the face of the states' new aggressive-
ness in applying their own law, it might have seized Allstate as an easy
case in which to do so.
Deciding Allstate differently would have been the first step in send-
ing that message to the states. Shutts would have been decided as it was,
but the message of that case would have been a re-enforcement of All-
state-a statement that "we really mean it"-rather than a footnote-like
375. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., A Wishful Thinker's Rehearing in the Hague Case, 10
HoRsmA L. REv. 1059, 1064-65 (1982).
376. All of the justices in Allstate agreed on this point. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 317-18; id
at 329-30 (Stevens, J. concurring); id at 337-38 (Powell, J., dissenting).
377. See Kirgis, supra note 375, at 1063.
378. Professor Shreve suggests consideration of the standard that, at least in cases in which
the application of a conflicting law of another, interested state is an option, "a state may consti-
tutionally apply its law only in situations in which the state has a policy which it has some
demonstrable interest in advancing." Shreve, supra note 158, at 351.
379. But see Louise Weinberg, Conflicts Cases and the Problem of Relevant Time: A Re-
sponse to the Hague Symposium, 10 HoFsmA L. REv. 1023, 1028 (1982) (arguing strength of
Minnesota's interest).
380. This analysis, of course, raises the definitional problem of forum-shopping: Can we
regard plaintiff Hague as having forum shopped when she sued in her own state? In his dis-
sent, Justice Powell raised the question of whether accepting her post-accident move would
encourage people to change citizenship in order to shop for law. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 337
(Powell, J., dissenting).
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decision establishing that there are outer limits even under a permissive
approach. The opinion notes that in the situation of "land and royalty
owners" in one state there is no expectation that the law of a different
state would control disputes. 81 This was an easy case for a territorial
approach. The Court might well have moved beyond it to discuss the
more general question of limits on the application of forum law to inter-
state entities doing business in the forum. The observation that "Kansas
certainly has an interest in regulating petitioner's conduct in Kansas"3 2
provided a nice opening for discussing what Kansas could not do and
why.
Sun Oil also could have been decided as it was. A somewhat differ-
ent opinion would have been called for, emphasizing even more the nar-
row scope of the issue before the Court: whether a forum state can apply
its statute of limitations to claims unrelated to it when the related state
considers the statute of limitations a procedural issue. 83 To demonstrate
that Allstate really does have teeth, it also would have been desirable for
the Court to avoid the general hands-off tone of the majority opinion.
I do not insist that the Court should have resolved these issues in
this manner as a matter of sound constitutional-conflicts law. Scholars
are sharply divided over how Allstate should have been decided. 384 My
point is that it could have done so. The issue before the Court was an
open one: What should be the constitutional response to widespread
state acceptance of choice-of-law theories leading to a preference for fo-,
rum law? Allstate presented a set of facts inviting a strong response.
Had the Court seized this opportunity, the result would be a quite differ-
ent climate for private law state-state forum-shopping.
How far the Court might have gone in curbing the role of the federal
courts as auxiliaries to that forum-shopping is an open question. Ferens
seems wrongly decided. If one accepts the proposition that the plaintiffs
got more in the federal system then they would have had in the state
381. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
382. Id at 819 (emphasis added).
383. In particular, the Court, under this analysis, would not have reached out in dictum to
validate other choice of law practices. Again, the matter is one of tone rather than results. In
this respect I agree with Professor Weinberg that the Sun Oil case greatly relaxes choice of law
standards. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 68-69.
384. For example, Professor Weinberg asserts that Allstate was correctly decided, and that
Minnesota law was the proper law of the case. See Weinberg, supra note 379, at 1028-29.
Professor Silberman thinks that Allstate was wrongly decided, and advocates limits on choice-
of-law "as a matter of federal common" law. Linda Silberman, Can the State of Minnesota
Bind the Nation?: Federal Choice-of-Law Constraints After Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
10 HoFsrsA L. REv. 103, 104-05 (1981). Professor Kirgis believes that Allstate was wrong as
a matter of constitutional law because applying the Minnesota rule violated due process.
Kirgis, supra note 375, at 1062.
[Vol. 71
FOR UM SHOPPING
system, the result violates classic Erie goals of preventing federal-state
forum-shopping. The Ferens problem of plaintiff-initiated transfers may
not arise with great frequency. A more important question is whether
the Court should have used that case to re-examine the Van Dusen rule
concerning defendant-initiated transfers. Without departing from the
neutrality-uniformity approach to Erie, one might ask whether plaintiffs
get more here as well when a federal court transfers a case that a state
court would have dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Perhaps
it makes sense not to complicate the law of § 1404 transfers. Perhaps a
per se rule is better than individualized inquiries into whether the plaintiff
or the defendant initially sought federal court. Time spent on such col-
lateral matters diverts judicial resources from the underlying suit. The
Court is unlikely to take any such step, especially since current § 1404(a)
practice under Van Dusen reflects well-established rules of statutory
construction.
If the Court really wanted to take a fresh look at whether defendant
forum-shopping violates Erie policies, a re-examination of Klaxon would
have provided a better vehicle. Allowing creation of federal choice of
law rules in diversity cases would give defendants an extraordinary set of
opportunities to escape plaintiff forum-shopping. Defendants would take
advantage of these opportunities through removal, since plaintiffs would
not start in the federal court if they feared unfavorable choice of law
rules. This puts the federal trial courts in the position of negating plain-
tiffs' state law opportunities. Removal is, however, a defendant's device,
and the function of diversity jurisdiction is to help parties who may face
unfairness in the state courts. Klaxon is taken to stand for the proposi-
tion that Erie blocks any such pro-defendant development," 5 even
though Erie was a case of forum-shopping by the plaintiff.
Even if the Court considered this step and went so far as to restate
Erie as primarily a case about regulatory federalism, Klaxon would sur-
vive re-examination. The uniformity-neutrality application of Erie
makes sense because it prevents undermining of the significant govern-
mental role played by the courts of the forum state when they adjudicate
cases applying their law. Choice of law doctrines are a part of that law.
For the federal courts not to apply them would take away an important
chunk of the state's regulatory authority. Once again the regulatory-fed-
eralism and the fairness-forum-shopping readings of Erie lead to ihe
same end result.
It is worth. noting that a supposedly pro-defendant Supreme Court
has neither reexamined the role of the lower federal courts as alders and
385. Ely, supra note 61, at note 125.
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abetters of state-state forum-shopping, nor considered the possible use of
those courts as neutral forums to cut back on the practice. These are, of
course, secondary issues in the broader debate over forum-shopping.
They arise only because the state courts are engaged so extensively in
encouraging the practice. Still, it is striking that Erie plays such a signifi-
cant role in the acceptance in Ferens of state-state forum-shopping. Per-
haps the Court reads Erie's view of federalism as neutral toward this
kind of state judicial activity, or even supportive of it. The question is
whether this reading of Erie, supposedly a constitutional case about the
power of federal courts, carries over to the recent constitutional cases on
choice of law and the power of state courts.
C. The Federalism Factor and the Inconsistency Critique
The result of these cases is to leave matters in the hands of the
states, and the Court's language makes it clear that is its intent.386 In
other words, in any clash between a defendant-oriented anti-forum-shop-
ping principle on the one hand and the rights and prerogatives of the
forum state on the other, the Court comes down firmly on the side of the
state. Federalism, defined broadly as the importance of ensuring the
states' primary role over a broad sphere of domestic governance, is the
dominant variable.
To understand the role of the federalism factor let us reconsider
cases that seem to reflect either an anti-forum-shopping principle or a
general pro-defendant tilt. An obvious starting point is Erie itself and the
post-Erie cases concerning whether to apply federal or state law in diver-
sity.387 An important element of these cases is pro-defendant results in
the face of potential forum-shopping by plaintiffs. At the same time the
pro-defendant result advances Erie's federalism goal: state governance in
the face of federal authority. Pro-plaintiff, anti-state results occur when
the Court discerns a strong federal policy linked to Congress38 or the
Constitution.3"9 Most of the post-Erie cases antedate the current Court,
but Walker, decided in 1980, fits the pattern. The same tendencies can
be seen in the current Court's unwillingness to fashion federal common
386. E.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1988) ("If current conditions
render it desirable that forum States no longer treat a particular issue as procedural for conflict
of laws purposes, those States can themselves adopt a rule to that effect .... ").
387. E.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 741-44 (1980); Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 461-64 (1965); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 543-45
(1949); Ragan v. Merchants Marine Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 531-32 (1949).
388. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472-73 (linking the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure to congressional power over the federal courts).
389. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-39 (1958) (linking federal
court jury practice to the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial).
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law. The defendant prevails, and state authority wins out over federal.
The notable exception is Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.390 There the
Court created federal common law to help a defendant whose status was
closely related to the federal government. 391 Boyle is a break in the pat-
tern, but it is a case in which federalism and pro-defendant concerns are
in direct opposition. 92 When both pull in the same direction Boyle sug-
gests a pro-defendint outcome is likely.
In a number of cases indicating an anti-forum-shopping or a pro-
defendant tilt the Court may simply not see any federalism interest pres-
ent. Two of its forum selection clause decisions were admiralty cases
governed by federal law. 93 The Court's desire to uphold and encourage
F.S.C.s also manifested itself in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 394 a diversity case that presented the issue of the role of F.S.C.s in
a § 1404(a) transfer motion. Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that under
Erie the Court should have looked at the law of the forum state to resolve
the initial question of the clause's validity. 39 The majority, eager to pro-
mote F.S.C.s, treated the entire issue as governed by § 1404(a). 396 As in
Boyle, the pro-defendant, nationalist position prevailed. Once again, the
point is that a clash between federalism and a pro-defendant interpreta-
tion of national law poses a difficult choice for the Cour-t. 3 97 Certainly,
when federalism is out of the equation one can see a strong tendency
toward a pro-defendant stance in such areas as summary judgment and
implied rights of action, although the latter may also be analyzed as a
variant of federal common law.
398
This analysis helps us understand why the Court's state-state forum-
shopping (choice of law) cases tend to favor the plaintiff. The Court
probably does not discern in these cases any national interest cutting one
way or the other. In Boyle and Ricoh a perceived national interest aug-
mented the inherent pro-defendant tilt.39 9 In choice of law cases the
390. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
391. Id at 504-13.
392. Justice Brennan dissented in Boyle. His argument for a pro-plaintiff result is based in
part on considerations of federalism. See id at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
393. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 3 (1972).
394. 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
395. Id. at 35-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
396. Id at 28-32.
397. It is worth noting that in all F.S.C. cases the Court's decision favored the party invok-
ing the clause who was also the defendant.
398. See Brown, supra note 268, at 628-29.
399. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-05 (1988); Ricoh, 487 U.S. at
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Court apparently does perceive a dominant federalism interest-that of
the state that wishes to regulate through adjudication of the dispute and
application of its law. Federalism encourages states to govern, and that
is what the forum state is trying to do. The Court's federalism also im-
plies an attitude of deference on the part of the national government
when assertions of state power are challenged as violative of constitu-
tional guarantees. The federalism variable drives the plaintiff's side of
the equation and works to counter any pro-defendant bias on the part of
the Court. State-state forum-shopping is fundamentally different from
federal-state forum-shopping because the latter impairs state governance,
while the former reflects the differences state governance fosters. 4w The
Court's hands-off policy may seem like that of a neutral umpire, making
sure only that individual states do not go too far. Alternatively, if vigor-
ous assertions of state power are the likely result, the umpire's apparent
neutrality will encourage forum states to follow their natural inclination
to apply their own law.
In the area of personal jurisdiction a debate has long raged over
whether the issues should be approached from the perspective of individ-
ual rights or from the perspective of federalism. 41° One might expect the
development of an analytical framework in which personal jurisdiction
issues are based on considerations of the defendant's rights, while choice
of law issues focus on the impact of the forum state's action on the fed-
eral system. One of the striking features of Allstate is the relative lack of
concern for the interests of the non-asserting state. Of the two relevant
constitutional provisions-the Due Process Clause and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause-it is the latter that is directed at those interests. Jus-
tice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, advocated a Full Faith and Credit
analysis under which the Court should not "invalidate a state court's
choice of forum law unless that choice threatens the federal interest in
national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of
another state." 2 That test seems unlikely to invalidate choice of forum
law, and it appears to be where the Court has ended up. The Court's
relative lack of concern for the non-asserting state is a widely noted as-
pect of its constitutional choice of law cases.' °3 I think that it tells a lot
400. One might inquire into whether state governance produces net benefits or incurs over-
all costs depending on whether or not the benefits to pro-plaintiff states from increased litiga-
tion outweigh the losses to pro-defendant states. In this context, at least, I find such inquires
somewhat speculative.
401. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702-03 n.10 (1982). The Court stated that personal jurisdiction is a matter of personal rights
rather than a federalism issue. Id.
402. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
403. Eg., Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 94, at 849.
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about the Court's vision of interstate federalism. The emphasis is not on
protecting states from each other but rather on encouraging them to act.
Vigorous assertions of state regulatory authority are a sign that the sys-
tem is working, rather than a danger sign of possible state parochialism.
Although Erie is not cited in the choice of law cases, its vision of
federalism manifests itself there as well. The dominant private law role
of the states and their courts remains relatively immune from federal in-
tervention, in this context intervention in the name of' constitutional
guarantees. Looking at the matter in this way also reminds us of the
reasons why Erie's condemnation of federal-state forum-shopping does
not carry over very far to the state-state variant. Surprise and uncer-
tainty on the defendant's part can be present there as well, but that seems
the weakest of Erie's possible anti-forum-shopping arguments. The exist-
ence of a federal system in which often more than one state will have a
claim of authority to regulate multistate transactions or occurrences
means that parties are often subject to more than one law. Whatever
weight the fairness reading of Erie has, it does not extend to state-state
forum-shopping, at least as long as all plaintiffs have presumptive access
to the forum's law regardless of citizenship. In sum, the constitutional
choice cases permit and perhaps foster state-state forum-shopping. They
differ from cases in which federalism and defendant's rights are on the
same side and differ as well from cases in which federalism is largely
absent. The Court's treatment of state-state forum-shopping does not
run afoul of Erie and, indeed, seems consistent with its vision of federal-
ism. Federalism is the dominant variable in the forum-shopping
equation.
In developing this argument I have focused on the Court's cases
dealing with forum-shopping in the private law context. My premise has
been that Erie is the fundamental precedent to grapple with in evaluating
the Court's treatment of the practice. Other writers, however, have em-
phasized the Court's decisions showing apparent hostility toward public
law forum-shopping and have contended that this attitude is inconsistent
with its hospitable approach in the private law context. Citing Younger
v. Harris,404 one commentator notes that "the Supreme Court denounces
state-federal forum-shopping on grounds of comity and parity," but that
"it countenances interstate forum shopping."' 5  According to this
writer, "Courts offer little justification for differential treatment of state-
federal and interstate forum-shopping. It is not clear, for instance, why
concerns about factors such as comity should play any greater role in the
404. 401 U.S. 37 (1971); see supra note 6.
405. Note, supra note 11, at 1682.
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former context than in the latter."406 Similarly, Brilmayer and Lee de-
scribe the Court as manifesting a "laissez-faire treatment of the forum
shopping problem," which they find "strikingly at odds with recent Bur-
ger Court opinions which disapprove of a moving party's efforts to obtain
a federal forum." 7
My disagreement with these writers is over their apparent willing-
ness to lump all forms of the practice together under one general head-
ing-"the forum-shopping problem." State-state forum-shopping by
private law plaintiffs presents different questions from federal-state fo-
rum-shopping by such plaintiffs. Use of the federal court system to ob-
tain substantive advantages not available in the state courts implicates
different constitutional values than does using one state's courts to obtain
substantive advantages not available in another state's courts. Public law
forum-shopping is different from both private law variants. Cases such
as Younger present issues of the role of the state courts in enforcing na-
tional constitutional norms, the role of the federal government in over-
seeing the operation of state government, and the role of the federal trial
courts in supervising the work of state courts. The role of federal trial
courts also looms large in federal-state private law forum-shopping cases.
State-state private law cases present the Court with the issue of its own
role: when should it step in to police exercises of authority by state
courts that may threaten the governmental balance between the states as
well as treat defendants unfairly?
Younger's invocation of comity" 8 rests on the recognition that the
national government-armed with weapons such as the Supremacy
Clause, 4 9 and possessing a nationwide system of courts to enforce its
commands-can swallow up the states as independent entities if not con-
tained. The Court's opposition to public law forum-shopping prevents
that from happening: comity is close to a constitutional value aimed at
protecting the states. Erie reflects a similar concern in a different con-
text: the need to prevent the lower federal courts from intruding upon
the private lawmaking sphere of the states and their courts.
In the context of state-state forum-shopping there is essentially no
threat to the vertical balance between the national government and the
states and not much threat to the horizontal balance among the states. A
number of factors serve to keep state judicial power in check, including
doctrines of personal jurisdiction, forum non conveniens dismissals and
406. Id. at 1683.
407. Brilmayer & Lee, supra note 94, at 839.
408. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.
409. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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restraints in state choice of law practices. States sometimes do exhibit
comity toward each other in this respect.4 l  Interstate comity is a desira-
ble attitude, but choice of law cases do not present the Court With an
inherent imbalance that elevates comity to an imperative. The Erie,
Younger, and Allstate cases must be seen as presenting different issues.
The current Court is anti-forum-shopping in the first two, but tolerant of
it, even encouraging, in the third. Once one recognizes the essential dif-
ferences between the issues, the apparent inconsistencies in the cases dis-
appear. Indeed, the states and their courts emerge as the victors in all
three.
D. Some Alternative Explanations
Although the federalism explanation for the Court's approach to fo-
rum-shopping strikes me as the most persuasive one, there are others that
merit consideration. What the Court does and does not do may reflect
the fact that its general authority over private law issues is limited.
When state courts act on matters of state law, the Supreme Court can
intervene only if the state court has transgressed constitutional bounda-
ries. On the other hand, in the context of Younger and, to a lesser extent,
in Erie, the Court is imposing subconstitutional principles as well as exer-
cising its control over the lower federal courts.411 State courts do many
things in private law adjudication that the conservative Supreme Court
Justices probably do not like. Punitive damages are an example. The
award of punitive damages is a major target of conservative critiques of
the role of litigation in American society. 12- Yet when the issue was
before the Court in 1991, in a somewhat egregious case,41 3 the Court
upheld the particular award as well as the general practice, suggesting
the imposition of only modest restraints on state judicial systems.414
410. A principal thesis of Professor Weinberg's recent article on choice of law is that the
states are moving increasingly toward a comity-based approach. See Weinberg, supra note 4,
at 60.
411. Erie, for example, can be seen as a case of statutory construction guided by principles
of federalism. The result in Younger can be viewed as the product of principles of comity and
federalism that derive ultimately from the Constitution but whose application in that case
could be overruled by Congress.
412. See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 146, at 82-83 (noting litigants' preference for jurisdictions
perceived to have sympathetic juries and large verdicts).
413. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). In this case the amount of
the punitive damages award was more than four times greater than the compensatory award.
Id at 1037, 1046. The Supreme Court admitted that this differential might make the case
"close to the line." Id at 1046.
414. Idi at 1046. The Court found limits in the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the
presence of post-verdict trial court review, and the availability of appellate review. Id at 1044-
46. Justice O'Connor, in dissent, described these protections as "so lacking in fundamental
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Even if one concedes the general point that the Court's ability to
deal with state-state forum-shopping is limited (although the Court
might use subconstitutional invocation of a general anti-forum-shopping
principle to curb use of the federal courts as auxiliaries to state-state fo-
rum-shopping), it is necessary to examine the constitutional provisions
that the Court can use to curtail state courts' freedom to apply their own
law. Whether the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses are
different in scope with respect to this matter is not clear. In any event, it
has been suggested that whatever limits they do impose are quite mod-
est.4"5 The Court's opinions support this view. Of course, the Court it-
self could change that, but to do so would require something of an
"activist" approach. An aggressive application of the Due Process
Clause to choice of law issues, for example, would require the type of
expansive judicial role that the conservative Justices reject.
416
The judicial activism concern suggests a related explanation for the
Court's hands-off attitude. Policing state court choice of law decisions
would require extensive Supreme Court involvement in what many see as
the conflict of laws "swamp. ' 4 17 The cases that come before state courts
present a plethora of highly fact-specific problems. Laying down general
principles with meaningful content could consume a substantial amount
of the Court's limited resources. The Justices may well feel that in con-
flict cases there is no middle ground between telling the state courts what
laws they cannot apply and frequent use of a weighing process to tell
them what laws they must apply.418 All three of these perspectives help
understand the Court's approach to choice of law and its resultant role in
forum-shopping. They supplement the federalism thesis offered in this
Article. The judicial activism point is particularly complementary to it.
fairness that the propriety of any specific award is irrelevant." Id. at 1056 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
415. E.g., Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law: The Perspective
of Constitutional Generalism, 10 HoesmA L. REv. 59, 85 (1981) (arguing that under due
process analysis, application of state law is arbitrary only where the state lacks an interest in
applying its laws or where it lacks a significant factual link to the "underlying transaction");
ia at 100 (arguing that, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, application of one state's law
over another state's can be limited only where the "federal interest in national unity" is
threatened).
416. One can find an illustration of this point in Justice Scalia's opinion in Sun Oil Co. v.
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1988). His opinion on the somewhat analogous issue of per-
sonal jurisdiction in Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), reflects some of the
same concerns. Id at 627 (reasoning that the Court cannot in the name of due process compel
states to abandon "the in-state-service basis of jurisdiction").
417. As Professor Gottesman points out, choice of law doctrine seems to have become
more than a little swampy. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 2 n.5.
418. Cf Gottesman, supra note 3, at 20 n.73 (noting the possibility of a weighing process as
opposed to the no-significant-interest test).
[Vol. 71
FOR UM SHOPPING
The Court can be seen as faithful to general structural-institutional prin-
ciples, even at the price of ignoring interests it otherwise would be dis-
posed to protect.
Professor Louise Weinberg has offered a somewhat different, and
highly challenging, explanation for the Court's apparent deference to
pro-plaintiff results reached by state courts in this area. As noted, she is
an eloquent defender of forum-shopping, in particular on the ground that
plaintiffs are "private attorney[s] general 419 whose successes help pre-
vent "systemic denials of law enforcement [that] pro lanto encourage
predatory or injurious conduct.""42 She sees the Supreme Court as hav-
ing played an active role in developing "mechanisms of interstate litiga-
tion" that are strongly pro-plaintiff.421 These mechanisms work to
ensure the prevalence of widely shared, pro-plaintiff views of both con-
tracts and torts. For her, the system's great merit is that it
reflects national policies that for other reasons are not imple-
mented in national legislation. These are rational national poli-
cies in favor of safe and fair interstate commerce. The structure
of the litigation system as it has evolved strongly suggests an
implicit national policy in favor of the forum's unilateral en-
forcement of local law.422
The apparent notion of the Supreme Court as co-conspirator in the
pro-plaintiff nationalization of American law strikes me as suspect. In
terms of content one would expect the Court to favor pro-defendant solu-
tions, an observation with which Professor Weinberg has seemed to agree
in another context.423 The Court's aversion to federal judicial lawmak-
ing suggests that it would want national policies on these issues to come
from Congress, if they are to come from a federal organ at all. Professor
Weinberg is right that the hands-off policy works, at least in the short
and mid-term,424 to maximize the influence of the assertive states. That
seems to be a price the Court is willing to pay for the diversity of federal-
ism rather than any implicit endorsement of (state) national consensus
law. At any rate, Professor Weinberg offers an intriguing perspective on
the mystery of the Court's seemingly pro-plaintiff stance.
419. Weinberg, supra note 4, at 70.
420. Id at 71.
421. Id. at 69.
422. Id.
423. See Weinberg, supra note 51, at 850.
424. It is possible that over time pro-defendant interests would band together to work for
national solutions that would undercut the pro-plaintiff policy of the assertive states. See Gott-
esman, supra note 3, at 29-30.
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E. The Future of Forum Shopping-Is an Alternative Federal Solution
Likely?
For the reasons offered above it seems that the Court is likely to
retain its stance. That means that the present pro-forum-shopping cli-
mate will continue, unless the states themselves change course.42 There
are, at least in theory, two alternative sources of federal intervention in
choice of law that could change the content of that field and thus the
climate. This closing subsection will examine each of them briefly and
demonstrate why neither is likely to happen.
The first approach is to put the lower federal courts into the picture
by having the Supreme Court, or Congress, declare that they have the
power to formulate choice of law rules as a matter of federal common
law. They could do this not only in diversity cases, but in any case
presenting the requisite interstate elements, and their rules would be
binding on the states under the Supremacy Clause.426 Because they
would be binding regardless of the court in which the case was brought,
there would be no danger of forum-shopping. The lower federal courts
would formulate these principles free of state parochialism in order to
further the national goal of eliminating biases between citizens and fric-
tion among states. Perhaps the federal common law need not contain
specific choice of law rules, but only broad guidelines and restraints.427
Would such a proposal be constitutional? As long as Congress pos-
sesses the power to declare such rules, it can probably delegate that
power. Indeed, delegation is the rationale for much of the federal com-
mon law that currently exists.42 Although the issue is not entirely free
from doubt, there are strong arguments that Congress possesses power in
this field.429 Whether the Supreme Court would accept such lawmaking
without a delegation is considerably more questionable. The Court has
consistently treated judge-made federal common law as a highly re-
stricted field, not co-extensive with the unexercised powers of Congress.
It recently summarized the limits in the following terms:
A few areas involving "uniquely federal interests," are so com-
mitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States to fed-
425. See Weinberg, supra note 4, at 60.
426. Field, supra note 48, at 897 n.64.
427. See Silberman, supra note 384, at 130.
428. Id. at 129-30.
429. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 729 (1988); Gottesman, supra note 3, at
23-28; Shreve, supra note 158, at 338. One possible source of power is the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. It authorizes Congress to "by general laws prescribe the manner in which




eral control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where
necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent ex-
plicit statutory directive) by the courts-so-called "federal
common law.""43
Choice of law may not fit these seemingly rigorous criteria. The United
States is not present in any party or proprietary capacity. 43' Nor does
the field seem to present the direct interstate clash present in a boundary
dispute.432 In any event, the Court's current strong inclination to leave
the choice of law field in the hands of the state courts makes it exceed-
ingly unlikely that it would give the lower federal courts license to roam
in the area.
If somehow the lower federal courts did become active in this area,
their involvement would pose serious questions for the federal judicial
system. An important question would be whether a choice of law case
would "arise under" the laws of the United States433 so that all cases
presenting a choice of law issue could be brought in federal court. If one
applies the strict test advocated by Justice Holmes-a case arises under
"the law that creates the cause of action"a34---these cases could only be
brought in state court, unless there was an independent source of federal
jurisdiction such as diversity. Of course, the Holmes test is not the only
approach to the "arising under" issue,4 35 and Congress could constitu-
tionally provide that all cases in Which federal choice of law rules could
be formulated could be brought initially in federal court.43 6
Either solution raises serious questions, however. On the one hand,
if the goal of federalizing choice of law is to put the lower federal courts
in the picture, it would seem that the parties should have the option of
placing choice cases in those courts.437 On the other hand, many of these
cases would present a tail-wagging-the-dog situation-state law cases in
federal court due only to the presence of a choice of law issue. Indeed,
430. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 480 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
431. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. U.S., 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943) (discussing importance of
providing uniform rules when the interests of the United States are present).
432. Hinderleder v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 94-98 (1938).
433. Field, supra note 48, at 897.
434. American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
435. See, eg., CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 3-98 (4th ed. 1983) (dis-
cussing different formulations of the test).
436. The outer bounds of constitutionally permissible federal question jurisdiction were
established in Osbor v. Bank of The United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 762-63 (1824).
Under the test formulated in Osborn it is certainly sufficient if a proposition of federal law is
part of the case.
437. As long as a choice of law case arose under the laws of the United States, the defend-
ant could remove it to federal court without regard to its citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)
(1988).
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one of the purposes of a strict approach to "arising under" is to keep
marginally federal cases in the state courts. The point has even greater
weight when one considers the mounting concern over the size of federal
court dockets.438 Perhaps authorizing federal adjudication of choice dis-
putes only in cases otherwise cognizable in the lower courts would pro-
vide enough federal decisions to keep the states in line. Even so, the
Supreme Court probably would have to review a number of these deci-
sions, given the need for uniformity of this new federal law. This raises
questions of the Supreme Court's own docket439 and of reconciling a fed-
eral law of conflicts with an obvious desire by the Court to stay out of the
field. Action by the Court in the federal common law direction strikes
me as exceedingly unlikely.
It is conceivable that Congress simply would authorize the federal
courts to do something in this area, although such an open-ended delega-
tion seems problematic and unlikely. The possibility of congressional ac-
tion brings up a second form of federal intervention that could alter the
current choice of law picture: passage of a statute containing choice of
law provisions. Professor Gottesman, based on a review and critique of
current choice of law practices and the resultant encouragement of fo-
rum-shopping, recently submitted an extremely well-developed proposal
for Congressional action. 4 ° He would have Congress enact relatively
specific provisions," 1 perhaps after "convening a panel of conflicts schol-
ars of varying viewpoints to make proposals as to what a federal law
should contain and to counsel Congress on the dangerous implications of
proposals that emanate from others."" 2 The result of Congress' deliber-
ations would be federal law supreme in both state and federal courts, but
Congress could keep the latter from being flooded by providing that cases
not otherwise within federal jurisdiction would not "arise under" the
choice of law provisions." 3 If Congress adopted indeterminate standards
it might also have to "create a centralized federal tribunal to which
choice of law questions could be referred from federal and state trial
courts." 4 Gottesman prefers relatively specific standards in the legisla-
tion, in part to avoid this particular mechanism, 445 and in part to prevent
438. See, eg., POSNER, supra note 228, at 169.
439. See, eg., Gottesman, supra note 3, at 37; Shreve, supra note 158, at 344.
440. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 16-50.
441. Id at 41-49.
442. Id. at 35.
443. Id. at 36-37.
444. Id at 39.
445. Id at 41.
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the Supreme Court from being "smothered"" 6 by the need to review
lower court decisions, especially those of state courts.447
Professor Gottesman is forthright in recognizing the drawbacks to
his proposal, but feels that they can be overcome. The problems it would
raise, if enacted, strike me as daunting indeed. Sorting out the roles of
the federal and state courts here seems as difficult as in the case of the
federal common law proposal. The prospect of the specialized tribunal
becoming the focal point of extensive satellite litigation is also trouble-
some." As Professor Gottesman recognizes, much would turn on the
specificity of what Congress enacted. It may be that the nature of the
field does not lend itself to detailed legislative solutions, and that the
move away from the First Restatement' 9 toward frequently indetermi-
nate standards reflects this fact.
More fundamental, however, is the question of whether Congress
should enter the field at all. We tend to view federalization of a field of
domestic law as something of a last resort, a course of action to be em-
barked upon only when state governance has broken down or proven
generally inequitable. The problem of forum-shopping, engendered by
state choice of law governance, may simply not rise to the level of ur-
gency that justifies national legislation. It has been argued that the cur-
rent choice of law system functions fairly well in operation despite
doctrinal rough spots. 450 One can agree with Professor Gottesman that
forum-shopping is a problem and that it presents considerable unfair-
ness.45 1 Perhaps, however, the interstate entities who are its principal
victims have learned to adjust with minimal dislocation. National ac-
tion, by either Congress or the federal courts, is a drastic step. Moreover
it would seem to run directly counter to the spirit of Erie and its re-
affirmation of the states' primary role in private law. Choice of law is an
important component of state governance through the common law. No
doubt it sometimes leads to untidy, even unfair, results, but that is a price
we pay for our federal system. The Supreme Court has been conserva-
tive, in the best sense of the word, in leaving a large portion of the forum-
shopping debate in the hands of the states.
446. Id at 37.
447. Id. Professor Gottesman is concerned with the possibility that state courts might
manipulate any set of federal rules in order to continue arriving at current results.
448. Professor Gottesman recognizes this prospect and proposes ways to deal with it. Id.
at 40-41.
449. See supra text accompanying notes 152-70 for a discussion of this development.
450. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Choice of Law: A Well-Watered Plateau, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 10, 26 (Spring 1977).
451. Gottesman, supra note 3, at 11-16.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Forum-shopping to obtain substantive law advantages is a complex
issue. The classical view that it is an outright evil is no longer universally
accepted, if indeed it ever was. State court choice of law practices often
favor forum-shopping. Substantial arguments have been advanced to jus-
tifyi the practice, particularly contentions based on the desirability of
moving the underlying law in a pro-plaintiff direction. In many respects
these arguments break down into a conservative-liberal debate. The role
of the current conservative Supreme Court in this debate manifests com-
plexities of its own. At times the Court has taken an anti-forum-shop-
ping approach, explicitly in its reading of Erie's application to private
law federal-state forum-shopping, and implicitly in cases such as Younger
dealing with public law federal-state forum-shopping.
Private law state-state forum-shopping presents a separate set of is-
sues. The Court appears to have recognized this and has permitted, per-
haps encouraged, the practice to flourish in this context. This may seem
a surprising step for a conservative Court, but when one considers the
Court's overriding commitment to federalism the apparent inconsisten-
cies disappear. Erie, with its vision of a dominant role for states and
their courts in private law matters, provides the key to understanding the
Court's approach to all three forms of forum-shopping. Although the
Court probably will continue to practice a hands-off approach toward
constitutional review of state choice of law practices, there are proposals
for alternative federal solutions. Erie's federalism argues against these
proposals as well. Forum-shopping is a problem; state choice of law
practices do abet it. When it comes to federal intervention, however, the
cure seems worse than the disease.
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